) 241 
17 
i70 
>py 1 







IHE CLASSIFICATION 



IE SCIENCES: 



TO WHICH ARE ADDED 



REASONS FOR DISSENTING 



IE PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTR 



HERBERT SPENCER. 



SECOND EDITION. ( WITH AN APPENDIX.) 



NEW YORK: 

APPLETON AND COMPANY, 

90, 92 & 94 GRAND STREET. 

1870. 



-e/gff 









ILLUSTRATIONS OF UNIVERSAL PRO 

SERIES OF 

1 Vol JLtarge if; mo. 470 Pago*. Prioe 






ill, 
IV. 

\ 
VL 

Fill 
2 
X. 




American Notice of Sp 
L Prog 

Fashion. 
The Gets 

Laughter, 
igin find Function of Music. 
The Nebular Hypot 
Sam ou the Emotions and the Will, 
Illogical 

The Development 
.icia! Organi* 
d Beauty. 
Sources of Architectural 1 
foe Use of Anthropoid 



says constitute a body of massive and oi 
large v r>portant topics, ai 

appreciate a bold and powerful i 

•ht which;- is beyond doubt the 

tant th it the human mind. has (ret reach <■.— .'■■ 

> have read the work on f « 
e author's min I 
position of first principles— hi facts — his h 

ant and con 

i 

an cm'. 

* ■> • 
pushing fea 

to th 
literary as w rotation oi 

' 
tellcct to fa*'. 

• ' • rai. 






•' 



FE3 






*\ 



THE 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES 



•V- ;: - # ; :•: - :••• 



: :./.•: 



THE 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 



In an essay on " The Genesis of Science," originally 
published in 1854, I endeavoured to show that the 
Sciences cannot be rationally arranged in serial order. 
Proof was given that neither the succession in which 
the Sciences are placed by M. Comte (to a criticism of 
whose scheme the essay was in part devoted), nor any 
other succession in which the Sciences can be placed, 
represents either their logical dependence or their his- 
torical dependence. To the question — How may their 
relations be rightly expressed ? I did not then attempt 
any answer. This question I propose now to con- 
sider. 

A true classification includes in each class, those 
objects which have more characteristics in common 
with one another, than any of them have in common 
with any objects excluded from the class. Further, 
the characteristics possessed in common by the colli- 
gated objects, and not possessed by other objects, are 
more radical than any characteristics possessed in 
common with other objects — involve more numerous 



dependent characteristics. These are two sides of the 
same definition. For things possessing the greatest 
number of attributes in common, are things that pos- 
sess in common those essential attributes on which the 
rest depend ; and, conversely, the possession in com- 
mon of the essential attributes, implies the possession 
in common of the greatest number of attributes. Hence, 
either test may be used as convenience dictates. 

If, then, the Sciences admit of classification at all, it 
must be by grouping together the like and separating 
the unlike, as thus defined. Let us proceed to do this. 

The broadest natural division among the Sciences, 
is the division between those which deal with the ab- 
stract relations under which phenomena are presented 
to us, and those which deal with the phenomena them- 
selves. Eelations of whatever orders, are nearer akin 
to one another than they are to any objects. Objects 
of whatever orders, are nearer akin to one another 
than they are to any relations. Whether, as some 
hold, Space and Time are forms of Thought.; or 
whether, as I hold myself, they are forms of Things, 
that have become forms of Thought through prgan- 
izcd and inherited experience of Things ; it is equally 
true that Space and Time are contrasted absolutely 
with the existences disclosed to us in Space and Time 
and that the Sciences which deal exclusively with 
Space and Time, are separated by the profoundest of 
all distinctions from the Sciences which deal with the 



existences that Space and Time contain. Space is the 
abstract of all relations of co-existence. Time is the 
abstract of all relations of sequence. And dealing as 
they do entirely with relations of co-existence and 
sequence, in their general or special forms, Logic and 
Mathematics form a class of the Sciences more widely 
unlike the rest, than any of the rest can be from one 
another. 

The Sciences which deal with existences themselves, 
instead of the blank forms in which existences are pre- 
sented to us, admit of a sub-division less profound than 
the division above made, but more profound than any 
of the divisions among the Sciences individually con- 
sidered. They fall into two classes, having quite dif- 
ferent aspects, aims, and methods. Every phenomenon 
is more or less composite — is a manifestation of force 
under several distinct modes. Hence result two ob- 
jects of inquiry. We may study the component modes 
of force separately ; or we may study them in their 
relations, as co-operative factors in this composite phe- 
nomenon. On the one hand, neglecting all the inci- 
dents of particular cases, we may aim to educe the 
laws of each mode of force, when it is uninterfered 
with. On the other hand, the incidents of the parti- 
cular case being given, we may seek to interpret the 
entire phenomenon, as a product of the several forces 
simultaneously in action. The truths reached through 
the first kind of inquiry, though concrete inasmuch as 
they have actual existences for their subject-matters, 



6 



are abstract inasmuch as they refer to the modes of 
existence apart from one another; while the truths 
reached by the second kind of inquiry arc properly 
concrete, inasmuch as they formulate the facts in their 
combined order, as they occur in Nature. 

The Sciences, then, in their main divisions, stand 
thus : — 



f that which treats of the forms in \ Abstract / Logic and \ 
which phenomena are known to us / Science V Mathematics. / 



SCIENCE is < 



in their 
elements 



that which treats of the 
k phenomena themselves < 



Abstract- /Mechanics, \ 
Concrete ( Physics, \ 

Science \Chemisiry,etc./ 



(Astronomy, \ 
Geology, Biology A 
Psychology, ' J 
Sociology, etc. / 



It is needful to define the words abstract and con- 
crete as thus used ; since they are sometimes used 
with other meanings. M. Comte divides Science into 
abstract and concrete; but the divisions which he 
distinguishes by these names are quite unlike those 
above made. Instead of regarding some Sciences 
as wholly abstract, and others as wholly concrete, he 
regards each Science as having an abstract part, and 
a concrete part. There is, according to him, an 
abstract mathematics and a concrete mathematics — an 



abstract biology and a concrete biology. He says : — 
"II faut distinguer, par rapport a tous les ordres de 
phenomenes, deux genres de sciences naturelles : les 
unes abstraites, generates, ont pour objet la decouverte 
des lois qui regissent les diverses classes de pheno- 
menes, en considerant tous les cas qu'on peut con- 
cevoir ; les autres concretes, particulieres, descriptives, 
et qu'on designe quelquefois sous le nom de sciences 
naturelles proprement dites, consistent dans Implica- 
tion de ces lois a Phistoire effective des differens etres 
existans." And to illustrate the distinction, he names 
general physiology as abstract, and zoology and botany 
as concrete. Here it is manifest that the words 
abstract and general are used as synonymous. They 
have, however, different meanings ; and confusion 
results from not distinguishing between their meanings. 
Abstractness means detachment from the incidents of 
particular cases. Generality means manifestation in 
numerous cases. On the one hand, the essential 
nature of some phenomenon is considered, apart from 
the phenomena which disguise it. On the other hand, 
the frequency of recurrence of the phenomenon, with 
or without various disguising phenomena, is the thing 
considered. An abstract truth is rarely if ever 
realized to perception in any one case of which it 
is asserted. A general truth may be realized to 
perception in all of the cases of which it is asserted. 
Some illustrations will make the distinction clear. 
Thus it is an abstract truth that the angle contained 



8 



in a semi-circle is a right angle — abstract in the sense 
that though it does not hold in actually-constructed 
semi-circles and angles, which are always inexact, it 
holds in the ideal semi-circles and angles abstracted 
from real ones ; but this is not a general truth, either 
in the sense that it is commonly manifested in Nature, 
or in the sense that it is a space-relation that compre- 
hends many minor space-relations : it is a quite 
special space-relation. Again, that the momentum 
of a body causes it to move in a straight line at a 
uniform velocity, is an abstract-concrete truth — a 
truth abstracted from certain experiences of concrete 
phenomena ; but it is by no means a general truth : 
so little generality has it, that no one fact in Nature 
displays it. Conversely, surrounding things supply 
us with hosts of general truths that are not in the 
least abstract. It is a general truth that the planets 
go round the Sun from West to East — a truth which 
holds good in something like a hundred cases (includ- 
ing the cases of the planetoids) ; but this truth 
is not at all abstract, since it is perfectly realized 
as a concrete fact in every one of these cases. Every 
vertebrate animal whatever, has a double nervous 
system ; all birds and all mammals are warm- 
blooded — these are general truths, but they are 
.concrete truths : that is to say, every vertebrate 
animal individually presents an entire and unqualified 
manifestation of this duality of the nervous system ; 
every living bird exemplifies absolutely or completely 



9 



the warm-bloodedness of birds. What we here call, 
and rightly call, a general truth, is simply a pro- 
position which sums up a number of our actual expe- 
riences ; and not the expression of a truth draivn 
from our actual experiences, but never presented to 
us in any of them. In other words, a general truth 
colligates a number of particular truths ; while an 
abstract truth colligates no particular truths, but 
formulates a truth which certain phenomena all in- 
volve, though it is actually seen in none of them. 

Limiting the words to their proper meanings as thus 
denned, it becomes manifest that the three classes 
of Sciences above separated, are not distinguishable 
at all by differences in their degrees of generality. 
They are all equally general ; or rather they are 
all, considered as groups, universal. Every phe- 
nomenon whatever presents at once the subject-matter 
for each of them. In the smallest particle of sub- 
stance we have simultaneously illustrated, the abstract 
truths of relation in Time and Space ; the abstract- 
concrete truths in conformity with which the particle 
manifests its several modes of force ; and the concrete 
truths expressing the laws of the joint manifestation 
of these modes of force. Thus these three classes of 
Sciences severally formulate different, but co-extensive, 
classes of facts. Within each group there are truths of 
greater and less generality : there are general abstract 
truths, and special abstract truths ; general abstract- 
concrete truths, and special abstract-concrete truths; 



10 



general concrete truths, and special concrete truths. 
But while within each class there are groups and 
sub-groups and sub-sub-groups which differ in their 
degrees of generality, the classes themselves differ 
only in their degrees of abstractness.* 

* Some propositions laid down by M. Littre, in his lately-published book — 
Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive, may fitly be dealt with here. In the 
candid and courteous reply he makes to my strictures on the Comtean classifica. 
tion in " The Genesis of Science," he endeavours to clear up some of the incon- 
sistencies I pointed out; and he does this by drawing a distinction between 
objective generality and subjective generality. He says — " qu'il existe deux 
ordres de generalite, l'une objective et dans les choses, l'autre subjective, abstraite 
et dans 1' esprit." This sentence, in which M. Littre make subjective generality 
synonymous with abstractness, led me at first to conclude that he had in view the 
same distinction as that which I have above explained between generality and 
abstractness. On re-reading the paragraph, however, I found this was not the 
case. In a previous sentence he says — " La biologie a passe de la consideration 
des organes a celles des tissus, plus generaux que les organes, et de la consideration 
des tissus a celle des elements anatomiques, plus generaux que les tissus. Mais 
cette generalite croissante est subjective non objective, abstraite non concrete." 
Here it is manifest that abstract and concrete, are used in senses analogous to 
those in which they are used by M. Comte; who, as we have seen, regards 
general physiology as abstract and zoology and botany as concrete. And it is 
further manifest that the word abstract, as thus used, is not used in its proper 
sense. For, as above shown, no such facts as those of anatomical structure can 
be abstract facts , but can only be more or less general facte Nor do I under- 
stand M. Littre's point of view when he regards these more general facts of 
anatomical structure, as subjectively general and not objectively general. The 
structural phenomena presented by any tissue, such as mucous membrane, are 
more general than the phenomena presented by any of the organs which mucous 
membrane goes to form, simply in the sense that the phenomena peculiar to the 
membrane are repeated in a greater number of instances than the phenomena 
peculiar to any organ into the composition of which the membrane enters. And, 
similarly, such facts as have been established respecting the anatomical elements 
of tissues, are more general than the facts established respecting any particular 
tissue, in the sense that they are facts which organic bodies exhibit in a greater 
number of cases — they are objectively more general; and they can be called 
subjectively more general only in the sense that the conception corresponds with 
the phenomena. 

Let me endeavour to clear up this point : — There is, as M. Littre truly says, 
a decreasing generality that is objective. If we omit the phenomena of Dissolu- 
tion, which arc changes from the special to the general, all changes which matter 
•mdcrgocs are from the general to the special— are changes involving a decreasing 



11 



Passing to the sub-divisions of these classes, we find 
that the first class is separable into two parts — the 
one containing universal truths, the other non-uni- 
versal truths. Dealing wholly with relations apart 
from related things, Abstract Science considers first, 
that which is common to all relations whatever ; and 
second, that which is common to each order of rela- 
tions. Besides the indefinite and variable connexions 
which exist among phenomena, as occurring together 
in Space and Time, we find that there are also definite 

generality in the united groins of attributes. This is the progress of things 
The progress of thought, is not only in the same direction, hut also in the oppo- 
site direction. The investigation of Nature discloses an increasing number of 
specialities ; but it simultaneously discloses more and more the generalities within 
which these specialities fall. Take a case. Zoology, while it goes on multiply- 
ing the number of its species, and getting a more complete knowledge of each 
species (decreasing generality) ; also goes on discovering the common characters by 
which species are united into larger groups (increasing generality). Eoth these 
are subjective processes ; and in this case, both orders of truths reached are con- 
crete — formulate the phenomena as actually manifested. 

M. Littre, recognizing the necessity for some modification of the hierarchy 
the Sciences, as enunciated by M. Comte, still regards it as substantially true 
and for proof of its validity, he appeals mainly to the essential constitutions of the 
Sciences. It is unnecessary for me here to meet, in detail, the arguments by 
which he supports the proposition, that the essential constitutions of the Sciences, 
justify the order in which M. Comte places them. It will suffice to refer to the 
foregoing pages, and to the pages which are to follow, as containing the defini- 
tions of those fundamental characteristics which demand the grouping of the 
Sciences in the way pointed out. As already shown, and as will be shown still 
more clearly by and bye, the radical differences of constitution among the 
Sciences, necessitate the colligation of them into the three classes — Abstract, 
Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete. How irreconcilable is M. Comte's classification 
with these groups, will be at once apparent on inspection. It stands thus : — 

Mathematics (including rational Mechanics), partly Abstract, partly 

Abstract-Concrete. 

Astronomy Concrete. 

Physics.... Abstract-Concrete. 

Chemistry Abstract-Concrete. 

Biology Concrete. 

Sociology Concrete. 



and invariable connexions — that between each kind of 
phenomenon and certain other kinds of phenomena, 
there exist uniform relations. This is a universal 
abstract truth — that there is an unchanging order 
among things in Space and Time. We come next 
to the several kinds of unchanging order, which, 
taken together, form the subjects of the second 
division of Abstract Science. Of this second divi- 
sion, the most general sub-division is that which 
deals with the natures of the connexions in Space 
and Time, irrespective of the terms connected. The 
conditions under which we may predicate a rela- 
tion of coincidence or proximity in Space and 
Time (or of non-coincidence or non-proximity) form 
the subject-matter of Logic. Here the natures and 
amounts of the terms between which the relations are 
asserted (or denied) are of no moment : the proposi- 
tions of Logic are independent of any qualitative 
or quantitative specification of the related things. 
The other sub-division has for its subject-matter, the 
relations between terms which are specified quanti- 
tatively but not qualitatively. The amounts of the 
related terms, irrespective of their natures, are here 
dealt with; and Mathematics is a statement of the 
laws of quantity considered apart from reality. Quan- 
tity considered apart from reality, is occupancy of 
Space or Time; and occupancy of Space or Time 
is measured by the number of coexistent or sequent 
positions occupied. That is to say, quantities can be 



13 



compared and the relations between them established, 
only by some direct or indirect enumeration of their 
component units; and the ultimate units into which 
all others are decomposable, are such occupied posi- 
tions in Space as can, by making impressions on 
consciousness, produce occupied positions in Time. 
Among units that are unspecified in their natures 
(extensive, protensive, or intensive), but are ideally 
endowed with existence considered apart from attri- 
butes, the quantitative relations that arise, are those 
most general relations expressed by numbers. Such 
relations fall into either of two orders, according as 
the units are considered simply as capable of filling 
separate places in consciousness, or according as they 
are considered as filling places that are not only sepa- 
rate, but equal. In the one case, we have that inde- 
finite calculus by which numbers of abstract existences, 
but not sums of abstract existence, are predicable. In 
the other case, we have that definite calculus by which 
both numbers of abstract existences and sums of 
abstract existence are predicable. Next comes that 
division of Mathematics which deals with the quanti- 
tative relations of magnitudes (or aggregates of units) 
considered as coexistent, or as occupying Space — the 
division called Geometry. And then we arrive at 
relations, the terms of which include both quantities 
of Time and quantities of Space — those in which 
times are estimated by the units of space traversed 
at a uniform velocity, and those in which equal 



14 

units of time being given, the spaces traversed with 
uniform or variable velocities are estimated. These 
Abstract Sciences, which are concerned exclusively 
with relations and with the relations of relations, may 
be grouped as shown in Table I. 

Passing from the Sciences that treat of the ideal or 
unoccupied forms of relations, and turning to the 
Sciences that treat of real relations, or the relations 
among realities, we come first to those Sciences which 
deal with realities, not as they arc habitually mani- 
fested to us, but with realities as manifested in their 
different modes, when these are artificially separated 
from one another. In the same way that the Abstract 
Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Abstract-Concrete 
and Concrete Sciences ; so the Abstract-Concrete 
Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Concrete Sciences. 
Just as Logic and Mathematics have for their object 
to generalize the laws of relation, qualitative and 
quantitative, apart from related things; so, Mecha- 
nics, Physics, Chemistry, etc., have for their object 
to generalize the laws of relation which different 
modes of Matter and Motion conform to, when seve- 
rally disentangled from those actual phenomena in 
which they are mutually modified. Just as the 
geometrician formulates the properties of lines and 
surfaces, independently of the irregularities and thick- 
nesses of lines and surfaces as they really exist; so, 
the physicist and the chemist formulate the mani- 



& rt 


M 


o 


<v 


CJ 




!+-. 


a 


o 


d 


r/i 


1 










-tj 






© 


f3 


















(H 


fl 




p! 






O 






r^ 


£ 




ed 


Cm 




O 



.r 

a> 



1 

P* 
-2 



H 

.a 
*| 

o 

S-l 

Ph 



S3 CS 

o o 



S5S 

75 s 



f-e 



m 5 






-2^- 



© . 

S3 ^ 



£ o 






•ao^aios lovxisav 



fee 4- 

J 8 



if 



© 2 



^^ 






•J 




2 










qp 




o s 




C3 <-> 












21 






.« 

« 

S 


ded into 
of Mot i 


0? 

o 


o *o 
in ^ 


05 

O 


r«3 

CO 


S 




'3 ^J 


O <* 

© Q 


pi 

05 
CO 

'P, 
© 

o 
o 
e*-l 






that i 
units. 






© 


Pi 


Pi 


o 






a 


V ^_ 




S3- 
O 


5B> 




H 

S3 



.ft<5 



^3 O 



p^ 

o 



v— 

© .L "^ 

6J3t3 
S | 

>>,s a 



cu 



2© Pj 



• £•18 J £*■&.&; 

qj cS 2. P CO oS S -u 






_ O l (D 



CD jj 

3.S 

P"J3 a 0.2 

'••33 > 5 ••> « E° o .3 

Si 'rH CO J. « — M 

8 " H H« Htf 23d ft S;:: °^ 
„-^j S3 "C^^S-^c^'S^^ 



'H rj 



<p 2 ** t; rt " s ." 

^ SB tpfl.2 



» o o -i^ a> 

fif!<Bo 



S^-^!— i 



P,P 

CD P - 

S g j; jo 

S3 » B .g 

^c P a 
^.2 n 1 
o +3 ,. P 
O ci^P 

§ £5 

c-g « « 
'd:^! ft 
q k « £j 

o^S _, 

P^-a 



8g-2 

41 o rt 

rj O O 

2 *r « 

& « » 



H Q (3 © O „ U 

ii:-i3|ilniiiP 

p.2oc^SS-Sp-S2ptl >?-i3 



■h O j) O '»! 

^pS' 



^•H 



el .2 



PSJ-a^-rSi 8 ^* 



5-2 ten 

. «< a s 

to p. e S H .t3 






he 

.a s js'a 

V S ro 

e j g *a 

'p.o go 
2 p «£ 

■s!a*§l 

p^.a 



- P CS 



o£S 



8^.S 
■Srfg 

■^J-og 

§2^3 
°^Sp 
^ H pc; 
o*. ^ v 

JLt3 p<rt 

fl)B K, d 

14 p ^I-S 

*« s °^ 
fses 

S PPt^ 

Pt.2.2 - 



15 



festations of each mode of force, independently of 
the disturbances in its manifestations which other 
modes of force cause in every actual case. In works 
on Mechanics, the laws of motion are expressed with- 
out reference to friction and resistance of the medium. 
Not what motion ever really is, but what it would 
be if retarding forces were absent, is asserted. If any 
retarding force is taken into account, then the effect 
of this retarding force is alone contemplated : neglect- 
ing the other retarding forces. Consider, again, the 
generalizations of the physicist respecting molecular 
motion. The law that light varies inversely as the 
square of the distance, is absolutely true only 
when the radiation goes on from a point without 
dimensions, which it never does ; and it also assumes 
that the rays are perfectly straight, which they cannot 
be unless the medium differs from all actual media in 
being perfectly homogeneous. If the disturbing 
effects of changes of media are investigated, the 
formulae expressing the refractions take for granted 
that the new media entered are homogeneous ; which 
they never really are. Even when a compound 
disturbance is allowed for, as when the refraction 
undergone by light in traversing a medium of in- 
creasing density, like the atmosphere, is calculated, 
the calculation still supposes conditions that are un- 
naturally simple — it supposes that the atmosphere 
is not pervaded by heterogeneous currents, which 
it always is. Similarly with the inquiries of the 



16 



chemist. He does not take his substances as Nature 
supplies them. Before he proceeds to specify their 
respective properties, he purifies them — separates from 
each all trace of every other. Before ascertaining the 
specific gravity of a gas, he has to free this gas from 
the vapour of water, usually mixed with it. Before 
describing the properties of a salt, he guards against 
any error that may arise from the presence of an 
uncombined portion of the acid or base. And when 
he alleges of any element that it has a certain atomic 
weight, and unites with such and such equivalents 
of other elements, he does not mean that the results 
thus expressed are exactly the results of any one 
experiment ; but that they are the results which, 
after averaging n.any trials, he concludes would be 
realized if absolute purity could be obtained, and 
if the experiments could be conducted without 
loss. His problem is to ascertain the laws of 
combination of molecules, not as they are actually 
displayed, but as they would be displayed in the 
absence of those minute interferences which cannot 
be altogether avoided. Thus all these Abstract-Con- 
crete Sciences have for their object, analytical inter- 
pretation. In every case it is the aim to decompose 
the phenomenon, and formulate its components apart 
from one another ; or some two or three apart from 
the rest. "Wherever, throughout these Sciences, syn- 
thesis is employed, it is for the verification of analysis.* 

* I am indebted to Prof. Frankland for pointing out an objection that may be 



17 



The truths elaborated are severally asserted, not as 
truths exhibited by this or that particular object ; but 
as truths universally holding of Matter and Motion in 
their more general or more special forms, considered 
apart from particular objects, and particular places in 
space. 

The sub-divisions of this group of Sciences, may be 
drawn on the same principle as that on which the 
sub-divisions of the preceding group Avere drawn. 
Phenomena, considered as more or less involved 
manifestations of force, yield on analysis, certain 
laws of manifestation that are universal, and other 
laws of manifestation, which, being dependent on 
conditions, are not universal. Hence the Abstract- 
Concrete Sciences are primarily divisible into — the 
laws of force considered apart from its separate modes, 
and laws of force considered under each of its sepa- 
rate modes. And this second division of the Abstract- 
Concrete group, is sub-divisible after a manner essen- 
tially analogous. It is needless to occupy space by 



made to this statement. The production of new compounds by synthesis, has of 
late become an important branch of chemistry. According to certain known laws 
of composition, complex substances, which never before existed, are formed, and 
fulfil anticipations both as to their general properties and as to the proportions of 
their constituents — as proved by analysis. Here it may be said with truth, that 
analysis is used to verify synthesis. Nevertheless, the exception to the above 
statement is apparent only — not real. In so far as the production of new com- 
pounds is carried on merely for the obtainment of such new compounds, it is not 
Science but Art— the application of pre-established knowledge to the achievement 
of ends. The proceeding is a part of Science, only in so far as it is a means to 
the better interpretation of the order of Nature. And how does it aid the inter- 
pretation ? It does it only by verifying the pre-established conclusions respecting 
the laws of molecular combination ; or by serving further to explain them. That 
is to say, these syntheses, considered on their scientific side, have simply the pur- 
pose of forwarding the analysis aj 'the laws of chemical combination. 

2 



18 



defining these several orders and genera of Sciences. 
Table II. will sufficiently explain their relations. 

We come now to the third great group. We have 
done with the Sciences which are concerned only with 
the blank forms of relations under which Being is 
manifested to us. We have left behind the Sciences 
which, dealing with Being under its universal mode, 
and its several non-universal modes regarded as inde- 
pendent, treats the terms of its relations as simple and 
homogeneous, which they never are in Nature. There 
remain the Sciences which, taking these modes of* 
Being as they are connected with one another, have for 
the terms of their relations, those heterogeneous combi- 
nations of forces that constitute actual phenomena. 
The subject-matter of these Concrete-Sciences is the 
real, as contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal. 
It is their aim, not to separate and generalize apart 
the components of all phenomena ; but to explain each 
phenomenon as a product of these components. Their 
relations are not, like those of the simplest Abstract- 
Concrete Sciences, relations between one antecedent 
and one consequent, nor are they, like those of the 
more involved Abstract-Concrete Sciences, relations 
between some few antecedents cut off in imagination 
from all others, and some few consequents similarly 
cut off; but they are relations each of which has for 
its terms a complete plexus of antecedents and a com- 
plete plexus of consequents. This is manifest in the 



•4^ <]J 



c5 



* 



I 



n co 



s X. 



go 






CO £ 

I 8 



r== S 



.2 § 

2 I 



'o 5fc2 



bo-* 



o p 



s- bo 5* 



O 4J 




.2 3 






-2 
1 



^.2 



OS 






P P* 



60 



l°.2 



«3r2 

o 

.a a 

£ o 

co "S 









2 3 a 



<2 



I! 



sa.s 

bt.n3 

S O 
T3 S3 
C O 



S.s 



SB 

o bo 



*M-g 



•aoN^ios aiaaoxoo-xov^rxsay 






19 



least involved Concrete Sciences. The astronomer 
seeks to explain the Solar System. He does not stop 
short after generalizing the laws of planetary move- 
ment, such as planetary movement would be did only 
a single planet exist ; but he solves this abstract- con- 
crete problem, as a step towards solving the concrete 
problem of the planetary movements as affecting one 
another. In astronomical language, "the theory of 
the Moon'' means an interpretation of the Moon's 
motions, not as determined simply by centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, but as perpetually modified by 
gravitation towards the Earth's equatorial protuber- 
ance, towards the Sun, and even towards Venus — 
forces daily varying in their amounts and combina- 
tions. !N*or does the astronomer leave off when he has 
calculated what will be the position of a given body 
at a given time, allowing for all perturbing influences ; 
but he goes on to consider the effects produced by re- 
actions on the perturbing masses. And he further 
goes on to consider how these mutual perturbations 
of the planets cause, during a long period, increasing 
deviations from a mean state ; and then how compen- 
sating perturbations cause continuous decrease in the 
deviations. That is, the goal towards which he ever 
strives, is a complete explanation of these complex 
planetary motions in their totality. Similarly with 
the geologist. He does not take for his problem only 
those irregularities of the Earth's crust that are 
worked by denudation; or only those which igueous 



20 



action causes. He does not seek simply to understand 
how sedimentary strata were formed; or how faults 
were produced; or how moraines originated, or how 
the beds of Alpine lakes were scooped out. But taking 
into account all agencies co-operating in endless and 
ever-varying combinations, he aims to interpret the 
entire structure of the Earth's crust. If he studies 
separately the actions of rain, rivers, glaciers, icebergs, 
tides, waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, etc. ; he does so 
that he may be better able to comprehend their joint 
actions as factors in geological phenomena : the object 
of his science being to generalize these phenomena in 
all their involved connections, as parts of one whole. 
In like manner Biology is the elaboration of a com- 
plete theory of Life, in each and all of its involved 
manifestations. If different aspects of its phenomena 
are investigated apart — if one observer busies himself 
in classing organisms, another in dissecting them, 
another in ascertaining their chemical compositions, 
another in studying functions, another in tracing laws 
of modification; they are all, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, helping to work out a solution of vital 
phenomena in their entirety, both as displayed by 
individual organisms and by organisms at large. 
Thus, in these Concrete Sciences, the object is the 
converse of that which the Abstract-Concrete Sciences 
propose to themselves. In the one case we have 
analytical interpretation ; while in the other case we 
have synthetical interpretation. Instead of synthesis 



21 

being used merely to verify analysis ; analysis is here 
used only to aid synthesis. Not to formulate the 
factors of phenomena is now the object ; but to formu- 
late the phenomena resulting from these factors, under 
the various conditions which the Universe present. 

This third class of Sciences, like the other classes, is 
divisible into the universal and the non-universal. As 
there are truths which hold of all phenomena in their 
elements ; so there are truths which hold of all pheno- 
mena in their totalities. As force has certain ultimate 
laws common to its separate modes of manifestation, 
so in those combinations of its modes which constitute 
actual phenomena, we find certain ultimate laws that 
are conformed to in every case. These are the laws 
of the re-distribution of force. Since we can become 
conscious of a phenomenon only by some change 
wrought in us, every phenomenon necessarily implies 
re-distribution of force — change in the arrangements 
of matter and motion. Alike in molecular movements 
and the movements of masses, one great uniformity 
may be traced. A decreasing quantity of motion, 
sensible or insensible, always has for its concomitant 
an increasing aggregation of matter ; and, conversely, 
an increasing quantity of motion, sensible or insensible, 
has for its concomitant a decreasing aggregation of 
matter. Give to the molecules of any mass, more 
of that insensible motion which we call heat, and the 
parts of the mass become somewhat less closely aggre- 
gated. Add a further quantity of insensible motion, 



22 

and the mass so far disintegrates as to become liquid. 
Add still more insensible motion, and the mass dis- 
integrates so completely as to become gas ; which 
occupies a greater space with every extra quantity 
of insensible motion given to it. On the other hand, 
every loss of insensible motion by a mass, gaseous, 
liquid, or solid, is accompanied by a progressing 
integration of the mass. Similarly with sensible 
motions, be the bodies moved large or small. Aug- 
ment the velocities of the planets, and their orbits will 
enlarge — the Solar System would occupy a wider 
space. Diminish their velocities, and their orbits will 
lessen — the Solar System will contract, or become 
more integrated. And in like manner we see that 
every sensible motion on the Earth's surface, involves 
a partial disintegration of the moving body from the 
Earth ; while the loss of its motion is accompanied by 
the body's re -integration with the Earth. In all phe- 
nomena we have either an integration of matter and 
concomitant disintegration of motion ; or an integra- 
tion of motion and concomitant disintegration of 
matter. And where, as in living bodies, the processes 
of integration and disintegration of matter and motion 
are going on simultaneously, there is an integration 
of matter proportioned to the disintegration of motion, 
and an integration of motion proportioned to the dis- 
integration of matter. These, then, are universal laws 
of that re-distribution of matter and motion everywhere 
going on — a re-distribution which results in Evolution 



23 

so long as the aggregation of matter and dissipation 
of motion predominate ; but which results in Dissolu- 
tion where there is a predominant aggregation of 
motion and dissipation of matter. Hence we have 
a division of Concrete Science which bears towards the 
other Concrete Sciences, a relation like that which Uni- 
versal Law of Relation bears to Mathematics, and like 
that which Universal Mechanics (composition and reso- 
lution of forces) bears to Physics. We have a division of 
Concrete Science which generalizes those concomitants 
of this re-distribution that hold good among all orders 
of concrete objects — a division which explains why, 
along with a predominating integration of matter and 
disintegration of motion, there must be a change from 
an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, 
coherent heterogeneity; and why a reverse re-distri- 
bution of matter and motion, must be accompanied by 
a reverse structural change. Passing from this uni- 
versal Concrete Science, to the non-universal Concrete 
Sciences ; we find that these are primarily divisible 
into the Science which deals with the re-distributions 
of matter and motion among the masses in space, con- 
sequent on their mutual actions as wholes ; and the 
science which deals with the re -distributions of matter 
and motion consequent on the mutual actions of the 
molecules in each mass. And of these equally general 
Sciences, this last is re-divisible into the Science which 
is limited to the concomitants of re-distribution among 
the molecules of each mass when regarded as mde- 



24 



pendent, and the Science which takes into account the 
molecular motion received by radiation from other 
masses. But these sub-divisions, and their sub-sub- 
divisions, will be best seen in the annexed Table III. 

That these great groups of Sciences and their re- 
spective sub-groups, fulfil the definition of a true 
classification given at the outset, is, I think, tolerably 
manifest. The subjects of inquiry included in each 
primary division, have essential attributes in common 
with one another, which they have not in common 
with any of the subjects contained in the other pri- 
mary divisions; and they have, by consequence, a 
greater number of common attributes in which they 
severally agree with the colligated subjects, and dis- 
agree with the subjects otherwise colligated. Between 
Sciences which deal with relations apart from realities, 
and Sciences which deal with realities, the distinc- 
tion is the widest possible; since Being, in some or 
all of its attributes, is common to all Sciences of the 
second class, and excluded from all Sciences of the first 
class. The distinction between the empty forms of 
things and the things themselves, is a distinction 
which cannot be exceeded in degree. And when 
we divide the Sciences which treat of realities, into 
those which deal with their separate components and 
those which deal with their components as united, 
we make a profounder distinction than can exist be- 
tween the Sciences which deal with one or other order 



• 2 & 

i I 

I I 






£ 

1 

2^ 2 



I ? I I M 4 ft | 



§ 



W Q, 



.ft ^ « to « 



CO 




« « o ^ o o 



s S 'a £> 2 



to 



nd 



o 



«3 



8 Ml 

S S5 ■*< o o o 

S P 2 » »- * 

£ ^ 5 fco to fco 

2 'S •& .2 .2 .a 



o 

'a 


o 


^ 


cr 




ft> 


br 




*» 


S 


• ~ 


^ 
.© 


feo 


« 


pq 




o 




xn 


o 




O 


PS 





a 



M « S g 5 .ft ' >r- 

.2 .2 <~ ® 2 ^ ^^ 

I I 5 1 I ■§ .-gf 

g' 3 2 | |A 

,rH ,rH •-' 'S t; © 

fcO fcO fcc S ©q3 

•ft .5 .5 m ^3 a 



-z 



c3 > fen 5P OT a> V^ 

to ^.2 n n ^ ' ^ a 



2 .ft ^a m 
2.2/*" >,§ 

-s^ 2 %t 



a to o 



^Sh 22 ^o.o s3 



2 



1^ ^SMB a| 



3 2* ^ila«= 



u ~ 



«■ ° "13 a<^ o S3 



ooo r/> 2 rt ^ o 3 



o a s o §2 



<jj rn *-* C **! o ^- / «; t/j '^^ ^ S C ^i 



— O ^4 S 

J S §S- *S,a<2J 



S o -Si ra^'S^g „• 8 & « 



*- w +j o ? o c © 

3 § I ' v ' mi 

§11 S-sSa 

^ ^l 1 ^ Isii 

is § a isi-a 

5-43 g^g 



« 2 w Pi o 
' ' a B.2 3«« to 



eo 



1 o 



lis al°p ; 

"^^ Ills- i 

^S a -B«So ~ 

o^ 13 



S-a 2.S "^ 

w ,o tc.3 =C ^ 



25 



of the components, or than can exist between the 
Sciences which deal with one or other order of the 
things composed. The three groups of Sciences may 
be briefly defined as — laws of the forms; laws of 
the factors; laws of the products. And when thus 
defined, it becomes manifest that the groups are 
so radically unlike in their natures, that there can 
be no transitions between them ; and that any 
Science belonging to one of the groups must be 
quite incongruous with the Sciences belonging to 
either of the other groups, if transferred. How 
fundamental are the differences between them, will be 
further seen on considering their functions. The first, 
or abstract group, is instrumental with respect to both 
the others ; and the second, or abstract-concrete group, 
is instrumental with respect to the third or concrete 
group. An endeavour to invert these functions will 
at once show how essential is the difference of 
character. The second and third groups supply 
subject-matter to the first, and the third supplies 
subject-matter to the second; but none of the truths 
which constitute the third group are of any use as 
solvents of the problems presented by the second 
group ; and none of the truths which the second 
group formulates can act as solvents of problems 
contained in the first group. Concerning the sub- 
divisions of these great groups, little remains to be 
added. That each of the groups, being co-extensive 
with all phenomena, contains truths that are universal 



26 



and others that are not universal, and that these must 
be classed apart, is obvious. And that the sub- 
divisions of the non-universal truths, are to be made in 
something like the manner shown in the tables, is 
proved by the fact that when the descriptive words 
are read from the root to the extremity of any branch, 
they form a definition of the Science constituting that 
branch. That the minor divisions might be other- 
wise arranged, and that better definitions of them 
might be given, is highly probable. They are here 
set down merely for the purpose of showing how this 
method of classification works out. 

I will only further remark, that the relations of the 
Sciences as thus represented, are still but imperfectly 
represented : their relations cannot be truly shown 
on a plane, but only in space of three dimensions. 
The three groups cannot rightly be put in linear 
order as they have here been. Since the first stands 
related to the third, not only indirectly through the 
second, but also directly — it is directly instrumental 
with respect to the third, and the third supplies it 
directly with subject-matter. Their relations can 
thus only be truly shown by a divergence from a 
common root on different sides, in such a way that 
each stands in juxta-position to the other two. And 
only by the like mode of arrangement, can the relations 
among the sub-divisions of each group be correctly 
represented. 



SEASONS FOR DISSENTING 



FROM THE 



PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE. 



While the preceding pages were passing through the 
press, there appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes for 
February 15th, an article on a late work of mine — First 
Principles. To M. Auguste Laugel, the writer of this article, 
I am much indebted for the careful exposition he has made of 
some of the leading views set forth in that work ; and for the 
catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt with 
them. In one respect, however, M. Laugel conveys to his 
readers an erroneous impression — an impression doubtless 
derived from what appears to him adequate evidence, and 
doubtless expressed in perfect sincerity. M. Laugel describes 
me as being, in part, a follower of M. Comte. After describing 
the influence of M. Comte as traceable in the works of some 
other English writers, naming especially Mr. Mill and Mr. 
Buckle, he goes on to say that this influence, though not 
avowed, is easily recognizable in the work he is about to 
make known ; and in several places throughout his review, 
there are remarks having the same implication. I greatly 
regret having to take exception to anything said by a critic 
so candid and so able. But the Revue des Deux Mondes cir- 
culates widely in England, as well as elsewhere ; and finding 
that there exists in some minds, both here and in America, 
an impression similar to that entertained by M. Laugel — 
an impression likely to be confirmed by his statement— it 
appears to me needful to meet it. 



28 



Two causes of quite different kinds, have conspired to diffuse 
the erroneous belief that M. Comte is an accepted exponent 
of scientific opinion ? His bitterest foes and his closest 
friends, have unconsciously joined in propagating it. On the 
one hand, M. Comte having designated by the term " Positive 
Philosophy" all that definitely- established knowledge which 
men of science have been gradually organizing into a cohe- 
rent body of doctrine ; and having habitually placed this in 
opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by 
theologians ; it has become the habit of the theological party 
to think of the antagonist scientific party, under the title 
of " positivists." And thus, from the habit of calling 
them " positivists," there has grown up the assumption 
that they call themselves "positivists," and that they are 
the disciples of M. Comte. On the other hand, those who 
have accepted M. Comte's system, and believe it to be 
the philosophy of the future, have naturally been prone 
to see everywhere the signs of its progress ; and wherever 
they have found opinions in harmony with it, have ascribed 
these opinions to the influence of its originator. It is always 
the tendency of discipleship to magnify the effects of the 
master's teachings ; and to credit the master with all the 
doctrines he teaches. In the minds of his followers, M. 
Comte's name is associated with scientific thinking, which, 
in many cases, they first understood from his exposition of it. 
Influenced as they inevitably are by this association of ideas, 
they are reminded of M. Comte wherever they meet with 
thinking which corresponds, in some marked way, to M. 
Comte's description of scientific thinking ; and hence are apt 
to imagine him as introducing into other minds, the con- 
ceptions which he introduced into their minds. Such im- 
pressions are, however, in most cases quite unwarranted. 
That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine 
and method elaborated by Science, is true. But it is not true 
that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, 



29 



are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry 
nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature 
and limits, are appreciably different from what they were 
before. If they are " positivists," it is in the sense that all men 
of science have been more or less consistently "positivists;" 
and the applicability of M. Comte's title to them, no more 
makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to 
men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, 
make these his disciples. M. Comte himself by no means 
claims that which some of his adherents are apt, by impli- 
cation, to claim for him. He says : — " II y a, sans doute, 
beaucoup d'analogie entre ma phiiosqphie positive et ce 
que les savans anglais entendent, depuis Newton surtout, 
par phiiosqphie naturelle ;" (see Acertissement) and further 
on he indicates the " grand mouvement imprime a Tesprit 
humain, il y a deux siecles, par Taction combinee des 
preceptes de Bacon, des conceptions de Descartes, et des de- 
couvertes de Galilee, comme le moment oil l'esprit de la 
philosophic positive a commence a se prononcer dans 
le monde." That is to say, the general mode of thought 
and way of interpreting phenomena, which M. Comte calls 
" Positive Philosophy," he recognizes as having been growing 
for two centuries ; as having reached, when he wrote, a 
marked development ; and as being the heritage of all men of 
science. 

That which M. Comte proposed to do, was to give scientific 
thought and method a more definite embodiment and organi- 
zation ; and to apply it to the interpretation of classes 
of phenomena not previously dealt with in a scientific 
manner. The conception was a great one ; and the endea- 
vour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and applause. 
Some such conception was entertained by Bacon. He, too, 
aimed at the organization of the sciences ; he, too, held that 
" Physics is the mother of all the sciences ;" he, too, held 
that the sciences can be advanced only by combining them, 



30 



and saw the nature of the required combination ; he, too, 
held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when 
separated from their roots in natural philosophy ; and thus 
he, too, had some idea of a social science growing out of 
physical science. But the state of knowledge in his day pre- 
vented any advance beyond the general conception : indeed, 
it was marvellous that he should have advanced so far. In- 
stead of a vague, undefined conception, M. Comte has pre- 
sented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated 
conception. In working out this conception he has shown 
remarkable breadth of view, great originality, immense fer- 
tility of thought, unusual powers of generalization. Con- 
sidered apart from the question of its truth, his system of 
Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. But after ac- 
cording to M. Comte high admiration for his conception, for 
his effort to realize it, and for the faculty he has shown in 
the effort to realize it, there remains the inquiry — Has he 
succeeded ? A thinker who re-organizes the scientific method 
and knowledge of his age, and whose re-organization is 
accepted by his successors, may rightly be said to have such 
successors for his disciples. But successors who accept this 
method and knowledge of his age, minus his re- organization, 
are certainly not his disciples. How then stands the case 
with M. Comte ? There are some few who receive his 
doctrines with but little reservation ; and these are his dis- 
ciples truly so called. There are others who regard with 
approval certain of his leading doctrines, but not the rest : 
these we may distinguish as partial adherents. There 
are others who reject all his distinctive doctrines ; and these 
must be classed as his antagonists. The members of this 
class stand substantially in the same position as they would 
have done had he not written. Declining his re-organ- 
ization of scientific doctrine, they possess this scientific 
doctrine in its pre-existing state, as the common heritage 
bequeathed by the past to the present ; and their adhesion to 



31 

this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates with M. Cornte. 
In this class stand the great body of men of science. And 
in this class I stand myself. 

Coming thus to the personal part of the question, let me 
first specify those great general principles on which M. 
Comte is at one with preceding thinkers ; and on which I am 
at one with M. Comte. 

All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte ; and 
this I also hold — hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. 
Comte : since, not only do I believe that all the ideas acquired 
by individuals, and consequently all the ideas transmitted by 
past generations, are thus derived ; but I also contend that 
the very faculties by which they are acquired, are the pro- 
ducts of accumulated and organized experiences received by 
ancestral races of beings (see Principles of Psychology). But 
the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, is not 
originated by M. Comte ; nor is it claimed by him. He 
himself says — " Tous les bons esprits repetent, depuis Bacon, 
qu'il n'y a de connaissances reelle que celles qui reposent sur 
des faites observes." And the elaboration and definite esta- 
blishment of this doctrine, has been the special characteristic 
of the English school of Psychology. Nor am I aware that 
M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done anything to 
make it more certain, or give it greater definiteness. Indeed it 
was impossible for him to do so ; since he repudiates that part 
of mental science by which alone this doctrine can be proved. 

It is a further belief of M. Comte, that all knowledge is 
phenomenal or relative ; and in this belief I entirely agree. 
But no one alleges that the relativity of all knowledge was 
first enunciated by M. Comte. Among others who have 
more or less consistently held this truth, Sir William Hamil- 
ton enumerates, Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin, Boethius, 
Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebroeus, Melanc- 
thon, Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Cam- 



32 



panella, Bacon, Spinoza, Newton, Kant. And Sir "William 
Hamilton, in his " Philosophy of the Unconditioned," first 
published in 1829, has given a scientific demonstration of this 
belief. Receiving it in common with other thinkers, from 
preceding thinkers, M. Comte has not, to my knowledge, 
advanced this belief. Nor indeed could he advance it, for 
the reason already given — he denies the possibility of that 
analysis of thought which discloses the relativity of all 
cognition. 

M. Comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes 
of phenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their 
causes ; and I coincide in the opinion that the assumption 
of such separate entities, though convenient, if not indeed 
necessary, for purposes of thought, is, scientifically con- 
sidered, illegitimate. This opinion is, in fact, a corollary 
from the last ; and must stand or fall with it. But like the 
last it has been held with more or less consistency for gene- 
rations. M. Comte himself quotes Newton's favorite saying 
— " ! Physics, beware of Metaphysics !" Neither to this 
doctrine, any more than to the preceding doctrines, has M. 
Comte given a firmer basis. He has simply re- asserted it ; 
and it was out of the question for him to do more. In this 
case, as in the others, his denial of subjective psychology 
debarred him from proving that these metaphysical entities are 
mere symbolic conceptions which do not admit of verification. 

Lastly, M. Comte believes in invariable natural laws — 
absolute uniformities of relation among phenomena. But 
very many before him have believed in them too. Long 
familiar even beyond the bounds of the scientific world, the 
proposition that there is an unchanging order in things, has, 
within the scientific world, held, for generations, the position 
of an established postulate : by some men of science recog- 
nized only as holding of inorganic phenomena ; but recog- 
nized by other men of science, as universal. And M. Comte, 
accepting this doctrine from the past, has left it substantially 



33 

as it was. Though he has asserted new uniformities, I do 
not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated 
them, as to make the induction more certain ; nor has he 
deductively established the doctrine, by showing that uni- 
formity of relation is a necessary corollary from the per- 
sistence of force, as may readily be shown. 

These, then, are the pre-established general truths with 
which M. Comte sets out — truths which cannot be regarded 
as distinctive of his philosophy. " But why," it will perhaps 
be asked, " is it needful to point out this ; seeing that no 
instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to M. 
Comte?" I reply that though no disciple of M. Comte 
would deliberately claim them for him ; and though no 
theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philo- 
phy, supposes M. Comte to be the first propounder of them ; 
yet there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines 
with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them, 
that false impressions are produced, even in spite of better 
knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation, 
definite proof is at hand. In the JSTo. of the Revue des Deux 
Mondes named at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, 
the words — " Toute religion, comme toute philosophie, a la 
pretention de donner une explication de l'univers. La 
philosophie qui s'appelle positive se distingue de toutes les 
philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu'elle a renonce 
a cette ambition de l'esprit humain ;" and the remainder of 
the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the 
relativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins — 
" Tout imbu de ces idees, que nous exposons sans les discuter 
pour le moment, M. Spencer divise, etc." JNow this is one 
of those collocations of ideas which tends to create, or to 
strengthen, the erroneous impression I would dissipate. I do 
not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended to say 
that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the " Positive 
Philosophy," are peculiarly the ideas of M. Comte. But 



34 



little as lie probably intended it, his expressions suggest this 
conception. In the minds of both disciples and antagonists, 
"the Positive Philosophy" means the philosophy of M. 
Comte ; and to be imbued with the ideas of " the Positive 
Philosophy'* means to be imbued with the ideas of M. Comte 
— to have received these ideas from M. Comte. After what 
has been said above, I need scarcely repeat that the con- 
ception thus inadvertently suggested, is a wrong one. M. 
Comte's brief enunciations of these general truths, gave me 
no clearer apprehensions of them than I had before. Such 
clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions, as I can 
trace to any particular teacher, I owe to Sir "William 
Hamilton. 

From the principles which M. Comte held in common with 
many preceding and contemporary thinkers, let us pass now 
to the principles that are distinctive of his system. Just as 
entirely as I agree with M. Comte on those cardinal doctrines 
which we jointly inherit ; so entirely do I disagree with him 
on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds, and which 
determine the organization of his philosophy. The best way 
of showing this will be to compare, side by side, the — 

Propositions Jeld ly Propositions which I hold. 

"...chacune de nos con- The progress of our conceptions, 

ceptions principales, chaque and of each branch of knowledge, is 

branche de nos connaissan- from beginning to end intrinsically 

ces, passe successivement alike. There are not three methods 

par trois etats theoriques of philosophizing radically opposed; 

diffdrens: l'etat theologique, but one method of philosophizing 

ou fictif ; l'etat metaphy- which remains, in essence, the same, 

sique, ou abstrait ; l'etat At first, and to the last, the conceived 

scientifiquc, ou positif. Kn causal agencies of phenomena, have a 

d'autres termes, l'esprit hu- degree of generality corresponding to 

main, par sa nature, em- the width of the generalizations 

ploie successivement dans which experiences have determined ; 

chacune de ses recherches and they change just as gradually as 

trois melhodcs de philoso- experiences accumulate. The into- 



35 



pher, dont le caractere est 
essentiellement different et 
meme radicalement oppose : 
d'abord la methode theolo- 
gique, ensuite la methode 
metaphysique, et enfin la 
methode nositive." p. 3. 



gration of causal agencies, originally 
thought of as multitudinous and 
local, but finally believed to be one 
and universal, is a process which in- 
volves the passing through all inter- 
mediate steps between these extremes ; 
and any appearance of stages can be 
but superficial. Supposed concrete 
and individual causal agencies, co- 
alesce in the mind as fast as groups 
of phenomena are assimilated, or seen 
to be similarly caused. Along with 
their coalescence, comes a greater ex- 
tension of their individualities, and 
a concomitant loss of distinctness in 
their individualities. Gradually, by 
continuance of such coalescences, 
causal agencies become, in thought, 
diffused and indefinite. And even- 
tually, without any change in the 
nature of the process, there is reached 
the consciousness of a universal causal 
agency, which cannot be conceived.* 4 

As the progress of thought is one, 
so is the end one. There are not 
three possible terminal conceptions ; 
but only a single terminal conception. 
When the theological idea of the 
providential action of one being, is 
developed to its ultimate form, by the 
absorption of all independent second- 
ary agencies, it becomes the conception 
of a being immanent in all pheno- 
mena ; and the reduction of it to this 
state, implies the fading-away, in 
thought, of all those anthropomorphic 
attributes by which the aboriginal 



" Le systeme theologique 
est parvenu a, la plus haute 
perfection dont il soit sus- 
ceptible, quand il a substi- 
tue Taction providentielle 
d'un etre unique au jeu 
varie des nombreuses divi- 
nites independantes qui a- 
vaient ete imaginees primi- 
tivement. De meme, le 
dernier terme du systeme 
metaphysique consiste a 
concevoir, au lieu des dif- 
ferentes entitesparticulieres, 

* A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the recent mental inte- 
gration of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc., as modes of molecular motion. If we 
go a step back, we see that the modern conception of Electricity, resulted from 
the integration in consciousness, of the two forms of it evolved in the galvanic 
battery and in the electric-machine. And going back to a still earlier stage, Ave 
see how the conception of statical electricity, arose by the coalescence in thought, 
of the previously-separate forces manifested in rubbed amber, in rubbed glass, and 
in lightning. With such illustrations before him, no one can, I think, doubt 
that the process has been the same from the beginning. 



36 



une seule grande entite ge- 
nerate, la nature, envisage e 
comme la source unique de 
tous les phenomenes. Pa- 
reillement, la perfection du 
systeme positif, vers laquelle 
il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
doive jamais l'atteindre, 
serait de pouvoir se repre- 
sentor tous les divers phe- 
nomenes observables comme 
des cas particuliers d'un 
seul fait general, tel que 
celui de la gravitation, par 
exemple." p. 5. 



idea was distinguished. The alleged 
last term of the metaphysical system 
— the conception of a single great 
general entity, nature, as the source 
of all phenomena^ — is a conception 
identical with the previous one : the 
consciousness of a single source which, 
in coming to be regarded as universal, 
ceases to be regarded as conceivable, 
differs in nothing but name from the 
consciousness of one being, mani- 
fested in all phenomena. And simi- 
larly, that which is described as the 
ideal state of science — the power to 
represent all observable phenomena 
as particular cases of a single general 
fact, implies the postulating of some 
ultimate existence of which this 
single fact is alleged ; and the postu- 
lating of this ultimate existence, 
involves a state of consciousness in- 
distinguishable from the other two. 



"...la perfection du sys- 
teme positif, vers laquelle 
il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
doive jamais Tatteindre, 
serait de pouvoir se repre- 
senter tous les divers phe- 
nomenes observables comme 
des cas particuliers d'un 
seul fait general, p. 5 ... 
. . . considerant comme ab- 
solument inaccessible, et 
vide de sens pour nous la 
recherche de ce qu'on ap- 
pelle les causes, soit pre- 
mieres, soit finales." p. 14. 



Though along with the extension 
of generalizations, and concomitant 
integration of conceived causal agen- 
cies, the conceptions of causal agencies 
grow more indefinite ; and though as 
they gradually coalesce into a uni- 
versal causal agency, they cease to be 
representable in thought, and are 
no longer supposed to be comprehen- 
sible ; yet the consciousness of cause 
remains as dominant to the last as it 
was at first; and can never be got 
rid of. The consciousness of cause 
can be abolished only by abolishing 
consciousness itself* {First Princi- 
ples, § 26.) 



* Possibly it "will be said that M. Comte himself admits, that what he calls the 
perfection of the positive system, will probably never be reachycl ; and that what 
he condemns is the inquiry into the natures of causes and not the general recog- 
nition of cause. To the first of these allegations, I reply tnat, as I understand 
M. Comte, the obstacle to the perfect realization of the positive philosophy is the 
impossibility of carrying generalization so far as to reduce all particular tacts to 



37 



"Ce n'est pas aux lec- 
teurs de cet ouvrage que je 
croirai jamais devoir prou- 
ver que les idees gouvernent 
et bouleversent le monde, 
ou, en d'autrcs termes, que 
tout le mecanisme social 
repose finalement sur des 
opinions. lis savent surtout 
que la grande crise politique 
et morale des societes ac- 
tuelles tient, en derniere 
analyse, a l'anarchie intel- 
lectuelle." p. 48.* 



Ideas do not govern and overthrow 
the world : the world is governed or 
overthrown by feelings, to which 
ideas serve only as guides. The 
social mechanism does not rest finally 
upon opinions; but almost wholly up- 
on character. Not intellectual anar- 
chy, but moral antagonism, is the 
cause of political crises. All social 
phenomena are produced by the to- 
tality of human emotions and beliefs : 
of which the emotions are mainly 
pre-determined, while the beliefs are 
mainly post-determined. Men's de- 
sires are chiefly inherited ; but their 
beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend 
on surrounding conditions; and the 
most important surrounding condi- 
tions depend on the social state which 
the prevalent desires have produced. 
The social state at any time existing, 
is the resultant of all the ambitions, 
self-interests, fears, reverences, in- 
dignations, sympathies, etc., of an- 
cestral citizens and existing citizens. 
The ideas current in this social state, 
must, on the average, be congruous 
with the feelings of citizens ; and 
therefore, on the average, with the 
social state these feelings have pro- 

cascs of one general fact — not the impossibility of excluding the consciousness of 
cause. And to the second allegation I reply, that the essential principle of his 
philosophy, is an avowed ignoring of cause altogether. For if it is not, what be- 
comes of his alleged distinction between the perfection of the positive system and the 
perfection of the metaphysical system ? And here let me point out that, by affirm- 
ing exactly the opposite to that which M. Comte thus affirms, I am excluded 
from the positive school. If his own definition of positivism is to he taken, 
then, as I hold that what he defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, 
it is clear that I cannot be what he calls a positivist. 

* A friendly critic alleges that M. Comte is not fairly represented by this 
quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M. Littre, for his too-great 
insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. If in his "Positive Politics," 
which I presume is here referred to, M. Comte abandons his original position, so 
much the better. But I am here dealing with what is known as "the Positive 
Philosophy ; " and that the passage above quoted does not misrepresent it, is proved 
both by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the 
Sociology, and by the fact that M. Comte's adherent, Mr. Buckle, re-asserts it 
in full. 



38 



" . . . je ne dois pas negliger 
d'indiquer d'avance, comrne 
une propriete essentielle de 
l'echelle encyclopedique que 
je vais proposer, sa con- 
forniite generale avec l'en- 
semble de l'histoire scien- 
tifique; en ce sens, que, 
malgre la simultaneitereelle 
et continue du developpe- 
ment desdiffe rentes sciences, 
celles qui seront classees 
comme anterieures seront, 
en effet, plus anciennes et 
constamment plus avancees 
que celles presentees comme 

posterieures." p. 84 

. . . . "Cet ordre est de- 
termine par le degre de sim- 
plicity, ou, ce qui revient 
au me me, par le degre de 
generalite des phenomenes." 
p. 87. 



duced. Ideas wholly foreign to this 
social state cannot be evolved, and if 
introduced from without, cannot get 
accepted — or, if accepted, die out 
when the temporary phase of feeling 
which caused their acceptance, ends. 
Hence, though advanced ideas when 
once established, act upon society 
and aid its further advance ; yet the 
establishment of such, ideas depends 
on the fitness of the society for re- 
ceiving them. Practically, the popu- 
lar character and the social state, 
determine what ideas shall be cur- 
rent; instead of the current ideas 
determining the social state and the 
character. The modification of men's 
moral natures, caused by the continu- 
ous discipline of social life, which 
adapts them more and more to social 
relations, is therefore the chief proxi- 
mate cause of social progress. (Social 
Statics, chap, xxx.) 

The order in which the generaliza- 
tions of science are established, is 
determined by the frequency and im- 
pressiveness with which different 
classes of relations are repeated in 
conscious experience ; and this de- 
pends, partly on the directness with 
which personal welfare is affected; 
partly on the conspicuousness of one or 
both the phenomena between ichich a 
relation is to be perceived; partly on the 
absolute frequency with which the re- 
lations occur; partly on their relative 
frequency of occurrence; partly on 
their deyree of simplicity ; and partly 
on their degree of abstractness. (Fird 
Principles, § 36). 



39 



"EnrSsultat definitif, la 
mathematique, l'astronomie, 
la physique, la chiraie, la 
physiologie, et la physique 
sociale ; telle est la formule 
enclyopedique qui, parmi le 
ties-grand norabre de clas- 
siiications que component 
les six sciences fondamen- 
tales, est seule logiquement 
conforme a la hierarchie 
naturelle et invariable des 
phenomenes," p. 115. 

" On congoit, en effet, que 
l'etude rationelle de chaque 
science fondamentale exi- 
geant la culture prealable 
de toutes celles qui la pre- 
cedent dans notre hierarchie 
enclyopedique, n'a pu faire 
de progres reels et prendre 
son veritable caractere, qu* 
apres un grand developpe- 
ment des sciences ante- 
rieures relatives a des phe- 
nomenes plus generaux, plus 
abstraits, moins compliques, 
et independans des autres. 
C'est done dans cet ordre 
que la progression, quoique 
simultanee, a du avoir lieu." 
p. 100. 



The sciences as arranged in this 
succession specified by M. Comte, do 
not logically conform to the natural 
and invariable hierarchy of pheno- 
mena; and there is no serial order 
whatever in which they can be placed, 
which represents either their logical 
dependence or the dependence of phe- 
nomena. (See Genesis of Science, 
and foregoing Essay.) 



The historical development of the 
sciences has not taken place in this 
serial order; nor in any other serial 
order. There is no "true filiation 
of the sciences." From the begin- 
ning, the abstract sciences, the 
abstract-concrete sciences, and the 
concrete sciences, have progressed to- 
gether : the first solving problems 
which the second and third present- 
ed, and growing only by the solution 
of the problems ; and the second 
similarly growing by joining the first 
in solving the problems of the third. 
All along there has been a continuous 
action and reaction between the three 
great classes of sciences — an advance 
from concrete facts to abstract facts, 
and then an application of such ab- 
stract facts to the analysis of new 
orders of concrete facts. (See Genesis 
of Science.) 



Such then are the organizing principles of M. Comte's 
philosophy. Leaving out of his "Exposition" those pre- 
established general doctrines which are the common property 
of modern thinkers ; these are the general doctrines which 
remain — these are the doctrines which fundamentally dis- 
tinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. 
To each proposition I oppose either a widely-different pro- 



40 



/ 



position, or a direct negation ; and I not only do it now, but 
have done it from the time when I became acquainted with 
his writings. This rejection of his cardinal principles should, 
I think, alone suffice ; but there are sundry other views 
of his, some of them largely characterizing his system, 
which I equally reject. Let us glance at them. 



How organic beings have 
originated, is an inquiry 
which M. Comte deprecates 
as a useless speculation : as- 
serting, as he does, that 
species are immutable. 



M. Comte contends that 
cf what'is commonly known 
as mental science, all that 
most important part which 
consists of the subjective 
analysis of our ideas, is an 
impossibility. 

M. Comte' s ideal of so- 
ciety is one in which govern- 
ment is developed to the 
greatest extent — in which 
class -functions are far more 
under conscious public regu- 
lation than now — in which 
hierarchical organization 
with unquestioned authority 
shall guide everything — in 
which the individual life 
6hall be subordinated in the 
greatest degree to the social 
life. 



This inquiry, I believe, admits of 
answer, and will be answered. That 
division of Biology which concerns 
itself with the origin of species, I 
hold to be the supreme division, to 
which all others are subsidiary. For 
on the verdict of Biology on this 
matter, must wholly depend our con- 
ception of human nature, past, pre- 
sent, and future ; our theory of the 
mind ; and our theory of society. 

I have very emphatically expressed 
my belief in a subjective science of 
the mind, by writing a Principles of 
Psychology, one half of which is sub- 
jective. 



That form of society towards which 
we are progressing, I hold to be one 
in which government will be reduced 
to the smallest amount possible, and 
freedom increased to the greatest 
amount possible — one in which 
human nature will have become so 
moulded by social discipline into fit- 
ness for the social state, that it will 
need little external restraint, but will 
be self-restrained — one in which the 
citizen will tolerate no interference 
with his freedom, save that which 
maintains the equal freedom of others 
— one in which the spontaneous co- 
operation which has developed our 
industrial system, and is now develop- 



41 

ing it with increasing rapidity, will 
produce agencies for the discharge of 
nearly all social functions, and will 
leave to the primary govermental 
agency nothing beyond the function 
of maintaining those conditions to 
free action, which make such spon- 
taneous co-operation possible — one in 
which individual life will thus be 
pushed to the greatest extent consis- 
tent with social life; and in which 
social life will have no other end than 
to maintain the completest sphere for 
individual life 



M. Comte, not including 
in his philosophy the con- 
sciousness of a cause mani- 
fested to us in all phe- 
nomena, and yet holding 
that there must be a reli- 
gion, which must have an 
object, takes for his object 
—Humanity. "This Col- 
lective Life (of Society) A is 
in Comte' s system the Etre 
Supreme ; the only one we 
can know, therefore the only 
one we can worship.'* 



I conceive, on the other hand, that 
the object of religious sentiment will 
ever continue to be, that which it has 
ever been — the unknown source of 
things. "While the forms under which 
men are conscious of the unknown 
source of things, may fade away, 
the substance of the consciousness is 
permanent. Beginning with causal 
agents conceived as imperfectly 
known ; progressing to causal agents 
conceived as less known and less 
knowable; and coming at last to a 
universal causal agent posited as 
not to be known at all ; the religious 
sentiment must ever continue to oc- 
cupy itself with this universal causal 
agent. Having in the course of 
evolution, come to have for its object 
of contemplation, the Infinite Un- 
knowable, the religious sentiment can 
never again (unless by retrogression) 
take a Finite Knowable, like Human- 
ity, for its object of contemplation. 

Here, then, are sundry other points, all of them important, 
and the last two supremely important, on which I am 
diametrically opposed to M. Comte ; and did space permit, 
I could add many others. Radically differing from him as I 
thus do, in everything distinctive of his philosophy; and 



42 



having invariably expressed my dissent, publicly and 
privately, from the time I became acquainted with his 
writings ; it may be imagined that I have been not a little 
startled to find myself classed as one of the same school. 
That those who have read 'First Principles only, may have 
been betrayed into this error in the way above shown, by the 
ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive Philosophy," I can 
understand. But that any who are acquainted with my pre- 
vious writings, should suppose I have any general sympathy 
with M. Comte, save that implied by preferring proved facts 
to superstitions, astonishes me. 

It is true that, disagreeing with M. Comte, though I do, 
in all those fundamental views that are peculiar to him, 
I agree with him in sundry minor views. The doctrine that 
the education of the individual should accord in mode and 
arfangement with the education of mankind, considered 
historically, I have cited from him ; and have endeavoured 
to enforce it. I entirely concur in his opinion that there 
requires a new order of scientific men, whose function shall 
be that of co-ordinating the results arrived at by the rest. 
To him I believe I am indebted for the conception of a 
social consensus ; and when the time comes for dealing with 
this conception, I shall state my indebtedness. And I also 
adopt his word, Sociology. There are, I believe, in the part 
of his writings which I have read, various incidental thoughts 
of great depth and value ; and I doubt not that were I to 
read more of his writings, I should find many others.* It 
is very probable, too, that I have said (as I am told I have) 
some things which M. Comte had already said. It would be 
difficult, I believe, to find any two men who had no opinions 
in common. And it would be extremely strange if two men, 

* M. Comte' s "Exposition" I read in the original in 1S53; and in two 
or three other places have referred to the original to get his exact words. 
The Inorganic Physics, and the first chapter of the Biology, I read in Miss 
Martinean's condensed translation, when it appeared. The rest of M. Comto'a 
views I know only through Mr. Lewes's outline, and through incidental references. 



43 



starting from the same general doctrines established by 
modern science, should traverse some of the same fields of 
inquiry, without their lines of thought having any points 
of intersection. But none of these minor agreements can be 
of much weight in comparison with the fundamental dis- 
agreements above specified. Leaving out of view that general 
community which we both have with the scientific thought 
of the age, the differences between us are essential, while 
the correspondences are non-essential. And I venture to 
think that kinship must be determined by essentials, and 
not by non-essentials.* 

Joined with the ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive 
Philosophy," which has led to a classing with M. Comte 
of many men who either ignore or reject his distinctive 
principles, there has been one special circumstance that has 
tended to originate and maintain this classing in my own 
case. The assumption of some relationship between M. Comte 
and myself, was unavoidably raised by the title of my first 
book — Social Statics. When that book was published, I was 
unaware that this title had been before used : had I 
known the fact, I should certainly have adopted an alternative 
title which I had in view.f If, however, instead of the title, 

* In his recent work, Auguste Comte et la Philosophic Positive, M. Littre, 
defending the Comtean classification of the sciences from the criticism I made 
upon it in the " Genesis of Science," deals with me wholly as an antagonist. 
The chapter he devotes to his reply, opens hy placing me in direct antithesis 
to the English adherents of Comte, named in the preceding chapter. 

f I believed at the time, and have never doubted until now, that the choice 
of this title was absolutely independent of its previous use by M Comte. While 
writing these pages, I have found reason to think the contrary. On referring to Social 
Statics, to see what were my views of social evolution in 1850, when M. Comte 
was to me but a name, I met with the following sentence : — " Social philosophy 
may be aptly divided (as political economy has been) into statics and dynamics." 
(p. 409). This I remembered to be a reference to a division which I had seen in 
the Political Economy of Mr. Mill. But why had I not mentioned Mr. Mill's name ? 
On referring to the first edition of his work, I found, at the opening of Book iv., 
this sentence : — "The three preceding parts include as detailed a view as the limits 
of this treatise permit, of what, by a happy generalization of a mathematical 
phrase, has been called the Statics of the subject." Here was the solution of the 
question. The division had not been made by Mr. Mill, but by some writer 
(on Political Economy I supposed) who was not named by him ; and whom I did 
not know. It is now manifest, however, that while I supposed I was giving 
a more extended use to this division, I was but returning to the original use 



44 



the work itself be considered, its ir relation to the philosopny 
of M. Comte, becomes abundantly manifest. There is decisive 
testimony on this point. In the North British Revieiv for 
August, 1851, a reviewer of Social Statics says — 

"The title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. 
According to all analogy, the phrase "Social Statics" should be 
used only in some such sense as that in which, as we have already 
explained, it is used by Comte, namely as designating a branch of 
inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium 
or order, as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress. 
Of this Mr. Spencer does not seem to have had the slightest notion, 
but to have chosen the name for his work only as a means of indi- 
cating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a 
scientific manner." p. 321. 

Respecting M. Comte's application of the words statics 
and dynamics to social phenomena, now that I know what 
it is, I will only say that while I perfectly understand how, 
by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings, 
the one may be used to indicate social functions in balance, 
and the other social functions out of balance, I am quite at a 
loss to understand how the phenomena of structure can be 
included in the one any more than in the other. But the 
two things which here concern me, are, first, to point out that 
I had not "the slightest notion" of giving Social Statics the 
meaning which M. Comte gave it ; and, second, to explain 
the meaning which I did give it. The units of any ag- 
gregate of matter, are in equilibrium when they severally 
act and re-act upon each other on all sides with equal forces. 
A state of change among them implies that there are forces 
exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like 
forces exercised by others; and a state of rest implies the 
absence of such uncounterbalanced forces — implies, if the 
units are homogeneous, equal distances among them — 
implies a maintenance of their respective spheres of molecular 

which Mr. Mill had limited to his special topic. Another thing is, I think, 
tolerahly manifest. As I evidently wished to point out my obligation to some 
unknown political economist, avIiosc division I thought I was extending, I should 
have named him had I known who he was. And in that case should not have 
put this extension of the division as though it were new 



45 



motion. Similarly among the units of a society, the funda- 
mental condition to equilibrium, is, that the restraining forces 
which the units exercise on each other, shall be balanced. 
If the spheres of action of some units are diminished by 
extension of the spheres of action of others, there necessarily 
results an unbalanced force which tends to produce political 
change in the relations of individuals ; and the tendency 
to change can cease, only when individuals cease to aggress 
on each other's spheres of action — only when there is 
maintained that law of equal freedom, which it was the 
purpose of Social Statics to enforce in all its consequences. 
Besides this totally-unlike conception of what constitutes 
Social Statics, the work to which I applied that title, is 
fundamentally at variance with M. Comte's teachings in 
almost everything. So far from alleging, as M. Comte does, 
that society is to be re-organized by philosophy ; it alleges 
that society is to be re-organized only by the accumulated 
effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase 
of authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of it. 
A more pronounced individualism, instead of a more pro- 
nounced nationalism, is its ideal. So profoundly is my 
political creed at variance with the creed of M. Comte, that, 
unless I am misinformed, it has been instanced by a leading 
English disciple of M. Comte, as the creed to which he has 
the greatest aversion. One point of coincidence, however, 
is recognizable. The analogy between an individual organism 
and a social organism, which was held by Plato and by 
Hobbes, is asserted in Social Statics, as it is in the Sociology 
of M. Comte. Yery ' rightly, M. Comte has made this 
analogy the cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy. 
In Social Statics, the aim of which is essentially ethical, 
this analogy is pointed out incidentally, to enforce certain 
ethical considerations ; and is there obviously suggested 
partly by the definition of life which Coleridge derived from 
Schelling, and partly by the generalizations of physiologists 
there referred to (chap. xxx. §§. 12, 13, 16). Excepting 



46 



this incidental agreement, however, the contents of Social 
Statics are so wholly antagonistic to the philosophy of 
M. Comte, that, but for the title, the work would never, 
I think, have raised the remembrance of him — unless, indeed, 
by the association of opposites.* 

And now let me point out that which really has exercised 
a profound influence over my course of thought. The truth 
which Harvey's embryological inquiries first dimly indicated, 
which was more clearly perceived by Wolff and Goethe, and 
which was put into a definite shape by Yon Baer — the truth 
that all organic development is a change from a state of 
homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity — this it is from 
which very many of the conclusions which I now hold, 
have indirectly resulted. In Social Statics, there is every- 
where manifested a dominant belief in the evolution of man 
and of society. There is also manifested the belief that this 
evolution is in both cases determined by the incidence of 
conditions — the actions of circumstances. And there is 
further, in the sections above referred to, a recognition of 
the fact that organic and social evolutions, conform to the 
same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various 
orders, every where determined by natural causes (beliefs again 
displayed in the Theory of Population and in the Principles 
of Psychology) ; the formula of Yon Baer acted as an 
organizing principle. The extension of it to other kinds 
of phenomena than those of individual and social organiza- 

* Let me add that the conception developed in Social Sialics, dates back to a 
series of letters on the " Proper Sphere of Government," published in the 
Nonconformist newspaper, in the latter half of 1842, and republished as a 
pamphlet in 1843. In these letters will be found, along with many crude ideas, 
the same belief in the conformity of social phenomena to unvariable laws ; the 
same belief in human progression as determined by such laws ; tiie same belief 
in the moral modification of men as caused by social discipline ; the same 
belief in the tendency of social arrangements "of themselves to assume 
a condition of stable equilibrium ;" the same repudiation of state-control over 
various departments of social life ; the same limitation of state-action to the 
maintenance of equitable relations among citizens. The writing of Social Sialic* 
arose from a dissatisfaction with the basis on which the doctrines set forth in those 
letters were placed : the second half of that work is an elaboration of these 
doctrines ; and the lirst half a statement of the principles from which they are 
dcducible. 



47 

tion, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen 
in the last paragraph of an essay on "The Philosophy of 
Style," published in October, 1852; again in an essay on 
"Manners and Fashion," published in April, 1854; and 
then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an essay on 
"Progess: its Law and Cause," published in April, 1857. 
Afterwards, there came the recognition of the need for 
further limitation of this formula ; next the inquiry into 
those general laws of force from which this universal trans- 
formation necessarily results ; next the deduction of these 
from the ultimate law of the persistence of force ; next the 
perception that there is everywhere a process of Dissolution 
complementary to that of Evolution ; and, finally, the deter- 
mination of the conditions (specified in the foregoir g essay) 
under which Evolution and Dissolution respectively occur. 
The filiation of these results, is, I think, tolerably manifest. 
The process has been one of continuous development, set up 
by the addition of Yon Baer's law to a number of ideas that 
were in harmony with it. And I am not conscious of any 
other influences by which the process has been affected. 

It is possible, however, that there may have been influences 
of which I am not conscious ; and my opposition to M. 
Comte's system may have been one of them. The presenta- 
tion of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definite- 
ness and development of one's own thoughts. It is probable 
that the doctrines set forth in the essay on " The Genesis of 
Science," might never have been reached, had not my very 
decided dissent from M. Comte's conception, led me to work 
them out ; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the 
classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay. 
Yery possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of 
repugnance to M. Comte's views, may have aided in elaborat- 
ing my own views ; though I cannot call to mind any other 
cases. 

Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that 
I do not regard M. Comte's speculations as of great value 



48 



True or untrue, his system as a whole, has doubtless produced 
important and salutary revolutions of thought in many 
minds; and will doubtless do so in many more. Doubtless, 
too, not a few of those who dissent from his general views, 
have been heathfully stimulated by the consideration of them. 
The presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a 
whole, whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have 
failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers. 
And he has done especial service by familiarizing men with 
the idea of a social science, based on the other sciences. 
Beyond which benefits resulting from the general character 
and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are scattered 
through his pages, many large ideas that are valuable not 
only as stimuli, but for their actual truth. 

It has been by no means an agreeable task to make these 
personal explanations ; but it has seemed to me a task not to 
be avoided. Differing so profoundly as I do from M. Comte 
on all fundamental doctrines, save those which we inherit in 
common from the past ; it has become needful to dissipate 
the impression that I agree with him — needful to show that 
a large part of what is currently known as "positive 
philosophy," is not "positive philosophy" in the sense of 
being peculiarly M. Comte's philosophy; and to show that 
beyond that portion of the so-called "positive philosophy" 
which is not peculiar to him, I dissent from it. 

And now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my 
great regret that these explanations should have been called 
forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liber- 
ally. Nothing will, I fear, prevent the foregoing pages from 
appearing like a very ungracious response to M. Laugel's 
sympathetically-written review. I can only hope that the 
gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it concerns 
myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient 
apology. 

March 12th, 1864. ■ 



APPENDIX. 



[ The following chapter was contained in the first edition 0/ 
First Principles. I omitted it from the re-organized second 
edition, because it did not form an essential part of the new 
structure. As it is referred to in the foregoing pages, and as 
its general argument is germane to the contents of those pages, 
I have thought well to append it here. Moreover, though 1 
hope eventually to incorporate it in that division of the Prin- 
ciples of Sociology which treats of Intellectual Progress, 
yet as it must be long before it can thus re-appear in its per- 
manent place, and as, should I not get so far in the execution 
of my undertaking, it may never thus re-appear at all, it seems 
proper to make it more accessible than it is at present. The 
first and last sections, which served to link it into the argument 
of the work to which it originally belonged, are omitted. The 
rest has been carefully revised, and in some parts considerably 
altered.~] 

LAWS IN GENERAL, 

The recognition of Law being the recognition of uni- 
formity of relations among phenomena, it follows that the 
order in which different groups of phenomena are reduced to 
law, must depend on the frequency with which the uniform 
relations they severally display are distinctly experienced. 
At any given stage of progress, those uniformities will be 
best known with which men's minds have been oftenest and 
most strongly impressed. In proportion partly to the 
number of times a relation has been presented to con- 
sciousness (not merely to the senses), and in proportion 
4 



50 

partly to the vividness with which the terms of the relation 
have been cognized, will be the degree in which the con- 
stancy of connexion is perceived. 

The succession in which relations are generalized being 
thus determined, there result certain derivative principles 
to which this succession must more immediately and ob- 
viously conform. First is the directness with which 
personal welfare is affected. While, among surrounding 
things, many do not appreciably influence us in any 
way, some produce pleasures and some pains, in various 
degrees ; and manifestly, those things whose actions on the 
organism for good or evil are most decided, will, ceteris 
paribus, be those whose laws of action are earliest ob- 
served. Second comes the conspicuousness of one or both 
phenomena between which a relation is to be perceived. On 
every side are phenomena so concealed as to be detected only 
by close observation ; others not obtrusive enough to attract 
notice ; others which moderately solicit the attention ; others 
so imposing or vivid as to force themselves on consciousness ; 
and, supposing conditions to be the same, these last will of 
course be among the first to have their relations general- 
ized. In the third place, we have the absolute frequency 
with which the relations occur. There are coexistences and 
sequences of all degrees of commonness, from those which 
are ever present to those which are extremely rare ; and 
manifestly, the rare coexistences and sequences, as well 
as the sequences which are very long in taking place, 
will not be reduced to law so soon as those which are 
familiar and rapid. Fourthly has to be added 
the relative frequency of occurrence. Many events and ap- 
pearances are limited to certain times or certain places, or 
both ; and, as a relation which does not exist within the 
environment of an observer cannot be perceived by him, 
however common it may be elsewhere or in another age, we 
have to take account of the surrounding physical circuru- 



51 

stances, as well as of the state of society, of the arts, and of 
the sciences — all of which affect the frequency with which 
certain groups of facts are observable. The 

fifth corollary to be noticed is, that the succession in 
which different classes of relations are reduced to law, de- 
pends in part on their simplicity. Phenomena presenting 
great composition of causes or conditions, have their essential 
relations so masked, that it requires accumulated experiences 
to impress upon consciousness the true connexions of ante- 
cedents and consequents they involve. Hence, other things 
equal, the progress of generalization will be from the simple 
to the complex ; and this it is which M. Comte has wrongly 
asserted to be the sole regulative principle of the pro- 
gress. Sixth comes t/ie degree of abstractness. 
Concrete relations are the earliest acquisitions. Such ana- 
lyses of them as separate the essential connexions from their 
disguising accompaniments, necessarily come later. The 
analyses of the connexions, always more or less compound, 
into their elements then becomes possible. And so on con- 
tinually, until the highest and most abstract truths have 
been reached. 

These, then, are the several derivative principles. The 
frequency and vividness with which uniform relations are 
repeated in conscious experience, determining the recognition 
of their uniformity, and this frequency and vividness depend- 
ing on the above conditions, it follows that the order in 
which different classes of facts are generalized, must depend 
on the extent to which the above conditions are fulfilled in 
each class. Let us mark how the facts harmonize with this 
conclusion: taking first a few that elucidate the general 
truth, and afterwards some that exemplify the special truths 
which we here see follow from it. 

The relations earliest known as uniformities, are those sub- 
sisting between the common properties of matter — tangi- 



52 

bility, visibility, cohesion, weight, etc. "We have no trace of 
a time when the resistance offered by an object was regarded 
as caused by the will of the object ; or when the pressure of 
a body on the hand holding it, was ascribed to the agency of a 
living being. And accordingly, these are the relations of which 
we are oftenest conscious ; being objectively frequent, conspi- 
cuous, simple, concrete, and of immediate personal concern. 

Similarly with the ordinary phenomena of motion. The 
fall of a mass on the withdrawal of its support, is a sequence 
which directly affects bodily welfare, is conspicuous, simple 
concrete, and very often repeated. Hence it is one of the 
uniformities recognized before the dawn of tradition. We 
know of no era when movements due to terrestrial gravi- 
tation were attributed to volition. Only when the relation 
is obscured — only, as in the case of an aerolite, where t\e 
antecedent of the descent is unperceived, do we find the con- 
ception of personal agency. On the other hand, mo- 
tions of intrinsically the same order as that of a falling stone 
— those of the heavenly bodies — long remain ungeneralized ; 
and until their uniformity is seen, are construed as results of 
will. This difference is clearly not dependent on compara- 
tive complexity or abstractness ; since the motion of a planet 
in an ellipse, is as simple and concrete a phenomenon as the 
motion of a projected arrow in a parabola. But the ante- 
cedents are not conspicuous ; the sequences are of long 
duration ; and they are not often repeated. And that these 
are the causes of their slow reduction to law, we see in the 
fact that they are severally generalized in the order of their 
frequency and conspicuousness — the moon's monthly cvcle, 
the sun's annual change, the periods of the inferior planets, 
the periods of the superior planets. 

TVhile astronomical sequences were still ascribed to voli- 
tion, certain terrestrial sequences of a different kind, but 
some of them equally without complication, were interpreted 
in like manner. The solidification of water at a low tempe- 



53 

rature, is -a phenomenon that is simple, concrete, and of 
much personal concern. But it is neither so frequent as 
those which we see are earliest generalized, nor is the pre- 
sence of the antecedent so manifest. Though in all "but 
tropical climates, mid-winter displays the relation between 
cold and freezing with tolerable constancy ; yet, during the 
spring and autumn, the occasional appearance of ice in the 
mornings has no very obvious connexion with coldness of 
the weather. Sensation being so inaccurate a measure, it is 
not possible for the savage to experience the definite relation 
between a temperature of 32° and the congealing of water ; 
and hence the long continued belief in personal agency. 
Similarly, but still more clearly, with the winds. The ab- 
sence of regularity and the inconspicuousness of the ante- 
cedents, allowed the mythological explanation to survive for 
a great period. 

During the era in which the uniformity of many quite 
simple inorganic relations was still unrecognized, certain 
organic relations, intrinsically very complex and special, 
were generalized. The constant coexistence of feathers and 
a beak, of four legs with an internal bony framework, are 
facts which were, and are, familiar to every savage. Did a 
savage find a bird with teeth, or a mammal clothed with 
feathers, he would be as much surprised as an instructed 
naturalist. Now these uniformities of organic structure thus 
early perceived, are of exactly the same kind as those more 
numerous ones later established by biology. The constant 
coexistence of mammary glands with two occipital condyles 
to the skull, of vertebrae with teeth lodged in sockets, of 
frontal horns with the habit of rumination, are generaliza- 
tions as purely empirical as those known to the aboriginal 
hunter. The botanist cannot in the least understand the 
complex relation between papilionaceous flowers and seeds 
borne in flattened pods : he knows these and like connexions 
simply in the same way that the barbarian knows the con- 



54 

nexions between particular leaves and particular kinds of 
wood. But the fact that sundry of the uniform relations 
which chiefly make up the organic sciences, were very early 
recognized, is due to the high degree of vividness and fre- 
quency with which they were presented to consciousness. 
Though the connexion between the sounds characteristic of 
a bird, and the possession of edible flesh, is extremely in- 
volved ; yet the two terms of the relation are conspicuous, 
often recur in experience, and a knowledge of their con- 
nexion has a direct bearing on personal welfare. Meanwhile 
innumerable relations of the same order, which are displayed 
with even greater frequency by surrounding plants and 
animals, remain for thousands of years unrecognised, if they 
are unobtrusive or of no apparent moment. 

When, passing from this primitive stage to a more ad- 
vanced stage, we trace the discovery of those less familiar uni- 
formities which mainly constitute what is distinguished as 
Science, we find the succession in which knowledge of them 
is reached, to be still determined in the same manner. This 
will become obvious on contemplating separately the in- 
fluence of each derivative condition. 

How relations that have immediate bearings on the 
maintenance of life, are, other things equal, fixed in the 
mind before those which have no immediate bearings, the 
history of Science abundantly illustrates. The habits of 
existing uncivilized races, who fix times by moons and barter 
so many of one article for so many of another, show us that 
conceptions of equality and number, which are the germs of 
mathematical science, were developed under the immediate 
pressure of personal wants ; and it can scarcely be doubted 
that those laws of numerical relations which are embodied in 
the rules of arithmetic, were first brought to light through 
the practice of mercantile exchange. Similarly with geo- 
metry. The derivation of the word shows us that it ori- 



55 

gin ally included only certain methods of partitioning ground 
and laying out buildings. The properties of the scales and 
the lever, involving the first principle in mechanics, were 
early generalized under the stimulus of commercial and 
architectural needs. To fix the times of religious festivals 
and agricultural operations, were the motives which led to 
the establishment of the simpler astronomic periods. Such 
small knowledge of chemical relations as was involved in 
ancient metallurgy, was manifestly obtained in seeking how 
to improve tools and weapons. In the alchemy of later 
times, we see how greatly an intense hope of private benefit 
contributed to the disclosure of a certain class of uniformities. 
Nor is our own age barren of illustrations. " Here," says 
Humboldt, when in Guiana, " as in many parts in Europe, the 
sciences are thought worthy to occupy the mind, only so far 
as they confer some immediate and practical benefit on 
society." " How is it possible to believe," said a missionary 
to him, " that you have left your country to come to be de- 
voured by mosquitoes on this river, and to measure lands 
that are not your own." Our coasts furnish like instances. 
Every sea- side naturalist knows how great is the contempt 
with which fishermen regard the collection of objects for the 
microscope or aquarium. Their incredulity as to the possible 
value of such things is so great, that they can scarcely be 
induced even by bribes to preserve the refuse of their nets. 
Nay, we need not go for evidence beyond daily table-talk. 
The demand for " practical science " — for a knowledge that 
can be brought to bear on the business of life — joined to the 
ridicule commonly vented on scientific pursuits having no 
obvious uses, suffice to show that the order in which laws 
are discovered greatly depends on the directness with which 
they affect our welfare. 

That, when all other conditions are the same, obtrusive 
relations will be generalized before unobtrusive ones, is so 
nearly a truism that examples appear almost superfluous. If 



56 

it be admitted that by the aboriginal man, as by tbe child, 
the co-existent properties of large surrounding objects are 
noticed before those of minute objects, and that the external 
relations which bodies present are generalized before their 
internal relations, it must be admitted that in subsequent 
stages of progress, the comparative conspicuousness of rela- 
tions has greatly affected the order in which they were 
recognized as uniform. Hence it happened that after the 
establishment of those very manifest sequences constituting 
a lunation, and those less manifest ones marking a year, and 
those still less manifest ones marking the planetary periods, 
astronomy occupied itself with such inconspicuous sequences 
as those displayed in the repeating cycle of lunar eclipses, 
and those which suggested the theory of epicycles and eccen- 
trics ; while modern astronomy deals with still more incon- 
spicuous sequences, some of which, as the planetary rotations, 
are nevertheless the simplest which the heavens present. In 
physics, the early use of canoes implied an empirical know- 
ledge of certain hydrostatic relations that are intrinsically 
mere complex than sundry static relations not empirically 
known; but these hydrostatic relations were thrust upon 
observation. Or, if we compare the solution of the problem 
of specific gravity by Archimedes with the discovery of at- 
mospheric pressure by Torricelli (the two involving me- 
chanical relations of exactly the same kind), we perceive that 
the much earlier occurrence of the first than the last was 
determined, neither by a difference in the irbearings on per- 
sonal welfare, nor by a difference in the frequency with 
which illustrations of them came under observation, nor by 
relative simplicity ; but by the greater obtrusiveness of the 
connexion between antecedent and consequent in the one case 
than in the other. Among miscellaneous illustrations, it 
may be pointed out that the connexions between lightning 
and thunder, and between rain and clouds, were recognized 
long before others of the same order, simply because they 



57 

thrust themselves on the attention. Or the long-delayed 
discovery of the microscopic forms of life, with all the phe- 
nomena they present, may be named as very clearly showing 
how certain groups of relations not ordinarily perceptible, 
though in other respects like long- familiar relations, have 
to wait until changed conditions render them perceptible. 
But, without further details, it needs only to consider the 
inquiries which now occupy the electrician, the chemist, 
the physiologist, to see that science has advanced, and is 
advancing, from the more conspicuous phenomena to the less 
conspicuous ones. 

How the degree of absolute frequency of a relation affects 
the recognition of its uniformity, we see in contrasting certain 
biological facts. The connexion between death and bodily 
injury, constantly displayed not only in men but in all in- 
ferior creatures, was known as an instance of natural causa- 
tion while yet deaths from diseases were thought super- 
natural. Among diseases themselves, it is observable that 
unusual ones were regarded as of demoniacal origin during 
ages when the more frequent were ascribed to ordinary 
causes : a truth paralleled among our own peasantry, who by 
the use of charms show a lingering superstition with respect 
to rare disorders, which they do not show with respect to 
common ones, such as colds. Passing to physical illustra- 
tions, we may note that within the historic period whirl- 
pools were accounted for by the agency of water-spirits ; but 
we do not find that within the same period the disappearance 
of water on exposure either to the sun or to artificial heat 
was interpreted in an analogous way : though a more mar- 
vellous occurrence, and a much more complex one, its great 
frequency led to the early recognition of it as a natural uni- 
formity. Rainbows and comets do not differ much in con- 
spicuousness, and a rainbow is intrinsically the more involved 
phenomenon ; but chiefly because of their far greater com- 
monness, rainbows were perceived to have a direct dependence 



5* 

on sun and rain while yet comets were regarded as signs of 
divine wrath. 

That races living inland must long have remained ignorant 
of the daily and monthly sequences of the tides, and that 
tropical races could not early have comprehended the pheno- 
mena of northern winters, are extreme illustrations of the 
influence which relative frequency has on the recognition of 
uniformities. Animals which, where they are indigenous, 
call forth no surprise by their structures or habits, because 
these are so familiar, when taken to countries where they 
have never been seen, are looked at with an astonishment 
approaching to awe — are even thought supernatural : a fact 
which will suggest numerous others that show how the local- 
ization of phenomena in part controls the order in which they 
are reduced to law. Not only however does their localization 
in space affect the progression, but also their localization in 
time. Facts which are rarely if ever manifested in one era, 
are rendered very frequent in another, simply through the 
changes wrought by civilization. The lever, of which the 
properties are illustrated in the use of sticks and weapons, is 
vaguely understood by every savage — on applying it in a 
certain way he rightly anticipates certain effects ; but the 
wheel- and-axle, pulley, and screw, cannot have their powers 
either empirically or rationally known till the advance of the 
arts has more or less familiarized them. < Through those 
various means of exploration which we have inherited and 
added to, we have become acquainted with a vast range of 
chemical relations that were relatively non-existent to the 
primitive man. To highly-developed industries we owe both 
the substances and the appliances that have disclosed to us 
countless uniformities which our ancestors had no oppor- 
tunity of seeing. These and like instances that will occur 
to the reader, show that the accumulated materials, and pro- 
cesses, and products, which characterize the environments of 
complex societies, greatly increase the accessibility of various 



59 

classes of relations ; and by so multiplying the experiences 
of them, or making them relatively frequent, facilitate their 
generalization. Moreover, various classes of phenomena 
presented by society itself, as for instance those which 
political economy formulates, become relatively frequent, and 
therefore recognizable, in advanced social states ; while in 
less advanced ones they are either too rarqly displayed to 
have their relations perceived, or, as in the least advanced 
ones, are not displayed at all. 

That, where no other circumstances interfere, the order in 
which different uniformities are established varies as their 
complexity, is manifest. The geometry of straight lines was 
understood before the geometry of curved lines ; the proper- 
ties of the circle before the properties of the ellipse, parabola, 
and hyperbola ; and the equations of curves of single cur- 
vature were ascertained before those of curves of double 
curvature. Plane trigonometry comes in order of time and 
simplicity before spherical trigonometry ; and the mensura- 
tion of plane surfaces and solids before the mensuration of 
curved surfaces and solids. Similarly with mechanics : the 
laws of simple motion were generalized before those of com- 
pound motion ; and those of rectilinear motion before those 
of curvilinear motion. The properties of equal- armed levers 
or scales, were understood before those of levers with un- 
equal arms ; and the law of the inclined plane was formulated 
earlier than that of the screw, which involves it. In chemis- 
try, the progress has been from the simple inorganic com- 
pounds to the more involved or organic compounds. And 
where, as in the higher sciences, the conditions of the explo- 
ration are more complicated, we still may clearly trace 
relative complexity as determining the order of discovery 
where other things are equal. 

The progression from concrete relations to abstract ones, 
and from the less abstract to the more abstract, is equally 
obvious. Numeration, which in its primary form concerned 



60 

Itself only with groups of actual objects, came earlier than 
simple arithmetic ; the rules of which deal with numbers 
apart from objects. Arithmetic, limited in its sphere to con- 
crete numerical relations, is alike earlier and less abstract 
than Algebra, which deals with the relations of these rela- 
tions* And in like manner, the Calculus of Operations comes 
after Algebra, both in order of evolution and in order of ab- 
stractness. In Mechanics, the more concrete relations of 
forces exhibited in the lever, inclined plane, etc., were un- 
derstood before the more abstract relations expressed in the 
laws of resolution and composition of forces ; and later than 
the three abstract laws of motion as formulated by Xewton 
came the still more abstract law of inertia. Similarly with 
Physics and Chemistry, there has been an advance from 
truths entangled in all the specialities of particular facts 
and particular classes of facts, to truths disentangled from 
the disguising incidents under which they are manifested — 
to truths of a higher abstractness. 

Brief and rude as is this sketch of a mental development 
that has been long and complicated, I venture to think it 
shows inductively what was deductively inferred, that the 
order in which separate groups of uniformities are recog- 
nized, depends not on one circumstance but on several cir- 
cumstances. The various classes of relations are generalized 
in a certain succession, not solely because of one particular 
kind of difference in their natures ; but also because they 
are variously placed in time and in space, variously open to 
observation, and variously related to our own constitutions : 
our perception of them being influenced by all these con- 
ditions in endless combinations. The comparative degrees 
of importance, of obtrusiveness, of absolute frequency, of 
relative frequency, of simplicity, of concreteness, are every 
one of them factors ; and from their unions in proportions 
that are never twice alike, there results a highly complex 
process of mental evolution. But while it is thus manifest 



61 



that the proximate causes of the succession in which relations 
are reduced to law, are numerous and involved ; it is also 
manifest that there is one ultimate cause to which these 
proximate causes are subordinate. As the several circum- 
stances that determine the early or late recognition of uni- 
formities are circumstances that determine the number and 
strength of the impressions which these uniformities make 
on the mind, it follows that the progression conforms to a 
certain fundamental principle of psychology. We see d 
posteriorly what we concluded a priori, that the order in which 
relations are generalized, depends on the frequency and 
impressiveness with which they are repeated in conscious 
experience. 

Having roughly analyzed the progress of the past, let 
us take advantage of the light thus thrown on the present, 
and consider what is implied respecting the future. 

Note first that the likelihood of the universality of Law 
has been ever growing greater. Out of the countless co- 
existences and sequences with which mankind are environed, 
they have been continually transferring some from the group 
whose order was supposed to be arbitrary, to the group 
whose order is known to be uniform. And manifestly, as 
fast as the relations that are unreduced to law become 
fewer, the probability that among them there are some that 
do not conform to law, becomes less. To put the argument 
numerically — It is clear that when out of surrounding phe- 
nomena a hundred of several kinds have been found to occur 
in constant connexions, there arises a slight presumption that 
all phenomena occur in constant connexions. When uni- 
formity has been established in a thousand cases, more varied 
in their kinds, the presumption gains strength. And when 
the known cases of uniformity amount to myriads, including 
many of each variety, it becomes an ordinary induction that 
uniformity exists everywhere. 



62 

Silently and insensibly their experiences have been press- 
ing men on towards the conclusion thus drawn. Not out of 
a conscious regard for these reasons, but from a habit of 
thought which these reasons formulate and justify, all minds 
have been advancing towards a belief in the constancy of 
surrounding coexistences and sequences. Familiarity with 
concrete uniformities has generated the abstract conception 
of uniformity — the idea of Law ; and this idea has been in 
successive generations slowly gaining fixity and clearness. 
Especially has it been thus among those whose knowledge of 
natural phenomena is the most extensive — men of science. 
The mathematician, the physicist, the astronomer, the che- 
mist, severally acquainted with the vast accumulations of 
uniformities established by their predecessors, and themselves 
daily adding new ones as well as verifying the old, acquire a 
far stronger faith in law than is ordinarily possessed. "With 
them this faith, ceasing to be merely passive, becomes an 
active stimulus to inquiry. Wherever there exist pheno- 
mena of which the dependence is not yet ascertained, these 
most cultivated intellects, impelled by the conviction that 
here too there is some invariable connexion, proceed to ob- 
serve, compare, and experiment ; and when they discover 
the law to which the phenomena conform, as they eventually 
do, their general belief in the universality of law is further 
strengthened. So overwhelming is the evidence, and such 
the effect of this discipline, that to the advanced student of 
nature, the proposition that there are lawless phenomena 
has become not only incredible but almost inconceivable. 

This habitual recognition of law which already distin- 
guishes modern thought from ancient thought, must spread 
among men at large. The fulfilment of predictions made 
possible by every new step, and the further command gained 
of nature's forces, prove to the uninitiated the validity of 
scientific generalizations and the doctrine they illustrate. 
Widening education is daily diffusing among the mass of 



63 

men that knowledge of these generalizations which has been 
hitherto confined to the few. And as fast as this diffusion 
goes on, must the belief of the scientific become the belief of 
the world at large. 

That law is universal, will become an irresistible con- 
clusion when it is perceived that the progress in the dis- 
covery of laics itself conforms to law ; and when this percep- 
tion makes it clear why certain groups of phenomena have 
been reduced to law, while other groups are still unreduced. 
When it is seen that the order in which uniformities are 
recognized, must depend upon the frequency and vividness 
with which they are repeated in conscious experience ; when 
it is seen that, as a matter of fact, the most common, impor- 
tant, conspicuous, concrete, and simple, uniformities were the 
earliest recognized, because they were experienced oftenest 
and most distinctly ; it will by implication be seen that long 
after the great mass of phenomena have been generalized, 
there must remain phenomena which, from their rareness, 
or unobtrusiveness, or seeming unimportance, or complexity, 
or abstractness, are still ungeneralized. Thus will be 

furnished a solution to a difficulty sometimes raised. When 
it is asked why the universality of law is not already fully 
established, there will be the answer that the directions in 
which it is not yet established are those in which its estab- 
lishment must necessarily be latest. That state of things 
which is inferable beforehand, is just the state which we find 
to exist. If such coexistences and sequences as those of 
Biology and Sociology are not yet reduced to law, the pre- 
sumption is not that they are irreducible to law, but that their 
laws elude our present means of analysis. Having long ago 
proved uniformity throughout all the lower classes of rela- 
tions, and having been step by step proving uniformity 
throughout classes of relations successively higher and higher, 
if we have not yet succeeded with the highest classes, it may 



64 

be fairly concluded, that our powers are at fault, rather 
than that the uniformity does not exist. And unless we 
make the absurd assumption that the process of generaliza- 
tion, now going on with unexampled rapidity, has reached 
its limit, and will suddenly cease, we must infer that ul- 
timately mankind will discover a constant order of mani- 
festation even in the most involved and obscure phenomena. 



Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appleion & Co. 



EDUCATION: 

INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL, 

1 Vol. 12mo. Price $3 50. 

Part I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth. 

II. Intellectual Education. 

III. Moral Education. 

IV. Physical Education. 

These discussions are able, vigorous, and suggestive. — American Journal o/ 
Science. 

They are undoubtedly among the most philosophical and important of the recent 
issues of the American Press. — Dr. John W. Draper. 

It is masterly and valuable beyond all other books on the theme. — Rev. T. Start 
King. 

These papers are clearly and gracefully written, and illustrate the author's fiesh 
and vigorous spirit, his power of separating the essential from the accidental, as well 
as his success in grasping the main features of the subject. — Atlantic Monthly. 

His book contains more good sense in a 6mall compass, than any book on Educa- 
tion we have ever seen. — Ren. Dr. Hill, Pres. Harvard College. 

In breadth of philosophical view, for depth of research in all directions, and for 
eurprislng familiarity with the details of nearly every department of science, Mr. 
Spencer has no competitor among English writers on Education. — Prof. W. F. Phelps. 
PHn. N. J. Normal School. 

It is a mighty book. — Anson Smyth, State School Com. of Ohio. 

The most philosophical and able discussion of the principles of Education that has 
> 2t appeared. — D. H. Cochran, Prin. N. T. State Normal School. 

It happily illustrates the importance of an intelligent knowledge of physical science 
as an element of education. I have read it with much pleasure and profit. — Prof. B. 
Silliman, Jr. 

The entire volume claims diligent study, and is replete with suggestions that inti- 
mately concern all parents and Educators. Its author is one of the great thinkers of 
the age. — North American Review. 

Its subjects are treated with profound ability and remarkable clearness of thought 
and extent of research. — N. T. Observer. 

We think it the most important book on the education of children ever written.— 
American Agriculturist. 

Profound in analysis, p-actical in suggestion, and sagacious in theory. — md« 
ptndmt. 

It throws a rare light upon the importance of studying the natural unfolding of 
the powers, and ministering to them the proper food at the proper time. — Albion. 

Barely have we seen a book of more cogent reasoning than this.— N. Y. EteninQ 
Poet. 



Woiks of Herbert Spencer published by If. .Appleton & Co. 



A NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

Vol. Large 12mo. 515 Pages. Price $2 00. 

Contents : 
Part First. — The Unknowable. 

ouaptei i. Religion and Science; II. Ultimate Religious ideas; ILL 
Ultimate Scientific Ideas; IV. The Relativity of all Knowledge; V. The 
Reconciliation. 

Part Second. — Laws of the Knowable. 

I. Laws in General; II. The Law of Evolution; III. The same con- 
tinued; IV. The Causes of Evolution; V. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and 
Force ; VI. The Indestructibility of Matter ; VII. The Continuity of Motion ; 
VIII. The Persistence of Force ; IX. The Correlation and Equivalence of 
Forces; X. The Direction of Motion ; XI. The Rhythm of Motion; XII. The 
Conditions Essential to Evolution ; XIII. The Instability of the Homoge- 
neous; XIV. The Multiplication of Effects; XV. Differentiation and Inte- 
gration ; XVI. Equilibration ; XVII. Summary and Conclusion. 

In the first part of this work Mr. Spencer defines the province, limits, and 
relations of religion and science, and determines the legitimate scope of 
philosophy. 

In part second he unfolds those fundamental principles which have been 
arrived at within the sphere of the knowable ; which are true of all orders 
of phenonema, and thus constitute the foundation of all philosophy. The 
law of Evolution, Mr. Spencer maintains to be universal, and he has here 
worked it out as the basis of his system. 

These First Principles are the foundation of a system of Philosophy 
bolder, more elaborate, and comprehensive perhaps, than any other which 
nas been hitherto designed in England. — British Quarterly Review. 

A work lofty in aim and remarkable in execution. — Corrihill Magazine. 

In the works of Herbert Spencer we have the rudiments of a positive 
Theology, and an immense step toward the perfection of the science of Psy- 
chology.— Christian Examiner. 

If we mistake not, in spite of the very negative character of his own re- 
sults, he has foreshadowed some strong arguments for the doctrine of a posi- 
ixve Christian Theology. — New Eng lander. 

As far as the frontiers of knowledge, where the intellect may go, there is 
BO living man whose guidance raav more safelv be trusted. — Ailanti* 
Monthly. 



Works published by D. Appleion & Co. 



THE CORRELATION AND CONSERVATION 



FORCES 



A SERIES OF EXPOSITIONS BY GROVE, MAYER, HELMHOLTZ, 
FARADAY, LIEBIG, AND CARPENTER. 



AN INTRODUCTION. 

BY E. L. YOTJMANS. 



The work embraces : 

I.— THE CORRELATION OF PHYSICAL FORCES. By 
W. R. Geove. (The complete work.) 

II.— CELESTIAL DYNAMICS. By De. J. R. Maybe. 

III.— THE INTERACTION OF FORCES. By Peof. Helm- 

HOLTZ. 

IV. — THE CONNECTION AND EQUIVALENCE OF 
FORCES. By Peof. Liebig. 

V.— ON THE CONSERVATION OF FORCE. By Db. 
Faeaday. 

VI.— ON THE CORRELATION OF PHYSICAL AND VI 
TAL FORCES. By De. Caepenteb. 



Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appleton & Co. 

ILLUSTRATIONS OF UNIVERSAL PROGRESS 

A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS. 

1 Vol Large 12mo. 470 Pages. Price 

CONTENTS : 

American Notice of Spencer's New System of Philosophy. 
L Progress : its Law and Cause. 
II. Manners and Fashion. 

III. The Genesis of Science. 

IV. The Physiology of Laughter. 

V. The Origin and Function of Music. 

VI. The Nebular Hypothesis. 

VII. Bain on the Emotions and the Will. 

VLTI. Illogical Geology. 

IX. The Development Hypothesis. 

X. The Social Organism. 

XI. Use and Beauty. 

XII. The Sources of Architectural Types. 

XIII. The Use of Anthropomorphism. 

These Essays constitute a body of massive and original thought upon a 
large variety of important topics, and will be read with pleasure by all who 
appreciate a bold and powerful treatment of fundamental themes. The 
general thought which pervades this book is beyond doubt the most impor- 
tant that the human mind has yet reached. — N. Y. Independent. 

Those who have read the work on Education, will remember the ana- 
lytic tendency of the author's mind — his clear perception and admirable ex- 
position of first principles — his wide grasp of facts — his lucid and vigorous 
style, and the constant and controlling bearing of the discussion on practical 
results. These traits characterize all Mr. Spencers writings, and mark, in 
an eminent degree, the present volume. — N. Y. Tribune. 

We regard the distinguishing feature of this work to be the peculiarly 
Interesting character of its matter to the general reader. This is a great 
literary as well as philosophic triumph. In the evolution of a system of 
Philosophy which demands serious attention, and a keen exercise of the in- 
tellect to fathom and appreciate, he has mingled much that is really popular 
and entertaining. — RocJiester Democrat. 






Works of Herbert Spencer published by I). App.eton db Co. 



ESSAYS: 

MORAL, POLITICAL, AND ESTHETIC. 

In one Volume. Large 12mo. 386 pag-es. 

contents: 
I. The Philosophy of Style. 
II. Over-Legislation. 

III. Morals of Trade. 

IV. Personal Beauty. 

V. Representative Government. 
VI. Prison-Ethics. 

VII. Railway Morals and Railway Policy. 
VIII. Gracefulness. 
IX. State Tamperings with Money and Banks. 
X. Reform : the Dangers and the Safeguards. 



" These Essays form a new, and if we are not mistaken, a most popular installment 
of the intellectual benefactions of that earnest -writer and profound philosopher, Her- 
bert Spencer. There is a remarkable union of the speculative and practical in these 
papers. They are the fruit of studies alike economical and psychological; they touch 
the problems of the passing hour, and they grasp truths of universal application ; they 
will be found as instructive to the general reader as interesting to political and social 
students." — Boston Transcript. 

•' These Essays exhibit on almost every page the powers of an independent human- 
itarian thinker. Mr. Spencer's ethics are rigid, his political views liberalistic, and his 
aim is the production oi the highest earthly good."— Methodist Quarterly R&vieie. 

" It abounds in the results of the sharp observation, the wide reach of knowledge, 
and the capacity to write clearly, forcibly, and pointedly, for which this writei Is pre- 
eminent. The subjects are all such a.s concern us most intimately, and they are treated 
with admirable tact and knowledge. The first essay on the Philosophy of Style is 
worth the cost of the volume ; it would be a. deed of charity to print it by itself, anc 1 
send it to the editor of every newspaper in the land." — New Englander. 

" Spencer is continually gaining ground with Americans ; he makes a book for our 
more serious moods. His remarks upon legislation, upon the nature of political insti- 
tutions and of then- fundamental principles; his elucidation of those foundation truths 
which control the policy of government, are of peculiar value to the American Btu- 
dent."— Boston Post. 

"This volume will receive the applause of every serious reader tor the profound 
earnestness and thoroughness with which its views are elaborated, the infinite scientific 
knowledge brought to bear on every question, and the acute and subtle thinking dis- 
played in every chapter."— N. W. Christian Advocate. 

"A more instructive, suggestive, and stimulating volume has not reacued us i» • 
'tug timo."— P) evidence Journal. 



Work* of Herbert Spencer published by D. AppUton db Co. 



The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, 



THE 

PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 

Vol. I. 475 pages. (Now in press.) 

CONTENTS: 

Part I. — The Data of Biology. 

I, Organie Matter. — II. The actions of Forces on Organic Matter. — III. Th< 
ve-actions of Organic Matter on Forces. — IV. Proximate Definition of 
Life. — V. The Correspondence between Life and its Circumstances. — 

VI. The Degree of Life varies as the Degree of Correspondence.— 

VII. The Scope of Biology. 

Part II. — The Inductions of Biology. 

I. Growth. — II. Development. — III. Function. — IV. Waste and Repair. — 
V. Adaptation. — VI. Individuality. — VII. Genesis. — VIII. Heredity. — 

IX. Variation. — X. Genesis, Heredity, and Variation. — XI. Classifica- 
tion. — XII. Distribution. 

Part III. — The Evolution of Life. 

I. Preliminary. — II. General Aspects of the Special-creation-hypothesis. — 
III. General Aspects of the Evolution-hypothesis. — IV. The Arguments 
from Classification. — V. The Arguments from Embryology. — VI. The 
Arguments from Morphology. — VII. The Arguments from Distribution. 
— VIII. How is Organic Evolution caused ? — IX. External Factors. — 

X. Internal Factors. — XI. Direct Equilibration. — XII. Indirect Equili- 
bration. — XIII. The Cooperation of the Factors. — XIV. The Converg- 
ence of the Evidences. 



All these works are rich in materials for forming intelligent opinions, even where 
we are unable to agree Avith those put forth by the author. Much may be learned from 
Jiem in departments in which our common Educational system is very deficient. The 
active citizen may derive from them accurate systematized information concerning hii 
highest duties to society, and the principles on which they are based. He may gain 
clearer notions of the value and bearing of evidence, and be better able to distinguish 
between facts and inferences. He may find common things suggestive of wiser thought 
—nay, we will venture to say of truer emotion — than before. By giving us fuller reali- 
zations of liberty and justice his writings will tend to increase our self-reliance in the 
creat emergency of civilization to which Ave have been summoned.— Atlantic MonVdv 



Works published by D. Appleton & Co. 



A NEW 

CLASS-BOOK OF CHEMISTRY. 

BY EDWARD L. YOUMANS, M. D. 
460 Pages. 910 Engravings. Price $1 75. 

Tiie Class-Book of Chemistry, published some ten years ago, has been rewritten, re 
illustrated, and much enlarged, and now appears as an essentially new work. Its aim 
Is to present the most important facts and principles of the science in their latest as- 
pects, and in such a manner as shall be suitable for purposes of general education. This 
volume brings up the science to the present date, incorporating the new discoveries, the 
corrected views, and more comprehensive principles which have resulted from recent 
Inquiry. Among these may be mentioned the newly-received doctrines of the nature 
of Heat, the interestiDg views of the Correlation and Conservation of Forces, the dis- 
coveries in Spectrum Analysis, and the new and remarkable researches on the artificial 
production of organic substances, and on the crystalloid and colloid conditions of mat 
ter, with many other results of recent investigations not found in contemporary test- 
books. 

For philosophical accuracy of arrangement, clearness of statement, and felicity of il- 
lustration, the Class-Book is unsurpassed. — A 7 ". Y. Teacher. 

Prof. Toumans possesses a rare faculty for bringing the intricacies of science right 
within the comprehension of the masses of readers, and his book presents all the in- 
terest of a novel. — Boston Post. 

The most recondite topics are placed in a transparent light before the common mind, 
the language is eminently choice and attractive, not an unwieldy paragraph, scarcely n 
superfluous word can be found from the beginning to the end of the work, and, in spite 
of the extreme economy of expression, there is no apparent constraint or formality, but 
every page flows smoothly and gracefully along, presenting a rare model of lucid and 
agreeable didactic statement. — A. Y. Tribune. 

The chapters on the Mutual Eelations of the Forces, and on the Dynamics of Vege- 
table Growth, are alone worth the price of the volume. — B. F. Leggett, Prof. Nat. 
Science, Whiteicater College, Ind. 

The present volume exhibits plentiful traits of what we believe we have before 
called Prof. Youmans' educational genius. — Methodist Quarterly Review. 

Unrivalled as a practical treatise. Its introduction on the " Origin and Nature of 
Scientific Knowledge" should be read by every teacher. — Mass. Teacher. 

One of its peculiar merits is that it can all be taught. — Prof. Phelps, N. J. for- 
mal School. 

Clear, accurate, recent, and imbued with the enthusiasm of its author. — R. M. Man- 
ley, Pres. N. II. Fern. College. 

It i3 eminently terse and compact, is amply and lucidly illustrated, and few tf our 
many class-books that have crossed the ocean and been welcomed in Europe, are calcu- 
lated to do us more credit than this admirable work, — A". Y. Independent. 

A thorough perusal of the book enables us to pronounce it the bett elementiiry 
chemistry that has been written in our language. It is penetrated by a fearless yet dis- 
ciplined scientific spirit, and is completely up to the level of the latest discoveries id 
the science of which it treats. We have read it with all the interest usually given to 
romance. — New Nation. 

This manual is distinguished from most other Class-books in setting almost whollj 
asido what is merely technical and experimental, for the sake of the completest possible 
exhibition of the principles of the subject. For the thorough student, and even for the 
general reader, a careful, lucid, and connected exposition of the- new views was needed, 
Buch as we are glad to acknoAvledge in the present volume. The author has given an 
intellectual value to his treatise very much abov* the 6tand;<rd aimed at in similar 
<rorks. — Christian Examiner. 



Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appltton & Co. 



The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. 



THE 

PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 

Vol. I. 475 pag-es. (Now in press.) 



CONTENTS: 

Part I. — The Data of Biology. 

L Organic Matter. — II. The actions of Forces on Organic Matter. — III. Th« 
re-actions of Organic Matter on Forces. — IV. Proximate Definition of 
Life. — V. The Correspondence between Life and its Circumstances. — 

VI. The Degree of Life varies as the Degree of Correspondence.— 

VII. The Scope of Biology. • 

Part II. — The Inductions of Biology. 

I. Growth. — II. Development. — III. Function. — IV. Waste and Repair. — 
V. Adaptation. — VI. Individuality. — VII. Genesis. — VIII. Heredity. — 

IX. Variation. — X. Genesis, Heredity, and Variation. — XL Classifica- 
tion. — XII. Distribution. 

Part III. — The Evolution of Life. 

L Preliminary. — n. General Aspects of the Special-creatiou-hypothcsis. — 
III. General Aspects of the Evolution-hypothesis. — IV. The Argument* 
from Classification. — V. The Arguments from Embryology. — VI. The 
Arguments from Morphology. — VII. The Arguments from Distribution. 
— VIII. How is Organic Evolution caused ? — IX. External Factors.— 

X. Internal Factors. — XI. Direct Equilibration. — XII. Indirect Equili- 
bration. — XIII. The Cooperation of the Factors. — XIV. The Converg- 
ence of the Evidences. 



All these works are rich in materials for forming intelligent opinions, even where 
we are unable to agree with those put forth by the author. Much may be learned from 
.hem in departments in which our common Educational system is very deficient. The 
active citizen may derive from them accurate systematized information concerning hil 
highest duties to society, and the principles on which they are based. He may gain 
clearer notions of the value and bearing of evidence, and be better able to distinguish 
between facts and inferences. He may find common things suggestive of wiser thought 
—nay, we will venture to say of truer emotion — than before. By giving us fuller reali- 
zations of liberty and justice his writings will tend to increase our self-reliance in the 
freat emergency of civilization to which we have been summoned.— Atlantic. Mnnthh 














LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

11 Mil! Ill 



111! 

010 133 621 9 



Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appleton & Co. 



EDUCATION: 

INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL, 

1 Vol. 12mo. Price $3 50. 

Part I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth. 

II. Intellectual Education 

III. Moral Educatiou. 

IV. Physical Education. 

These discussions are able, vigorous, and suggestive.— American Journal oj 
Science,. 

They are undoubtedly among the most philosophical and important of the rocen' 
issues of the American Press.- -Dr. John W. Draper. 

It is masterly and valuable beyond all other books on the theme. — Rev. T. Stan 
King. 

These papers are clearly and gracefully written, and illustrate the author's &esl 
and vigorous spirit, his power of separating the essential from the accidental as wel 
as his success in grasping the main features of the subject.— A tlantic Monthly. 

His book contains more good sense in a small compass, than any book on Educa 
tion we have ever seen. — Rev. Dr. Hill, Pres. Harvard College. 

In breadth of philosophical view, for depth of research in all directions, and fo 
surprising familiarity with the details of nearly every department of science, Ml 
Spencer has no competitor among English writers on Education. — Prof. W. F. Phelpt 
Pi'in. N. J. Normal School. 

It is a mighty book. — Anson Smyth, State School Coin, of Ohio. 

The most philosophical and able discussion of the principles of Education that ha 
> it appeared.— D. II. Cochran, Prin. N. Y. State Normal School. 

It happily illustrates the importance of an intelligent knowledge of physical scienc 
as an element of education. I have read it with much pleasure and profit. — Prof, i 
Silliman, Jr. 

The entire volume claims diligent study, and is replete with suggestions that int) 
mately concern all parents and Educators. Its author is one of the great thinkers o 
the age. — North American Revieto. 

Its subjects are treated with profound ability and remarkable clearness of thoug) 
and extent of research. — N. T. Observer. 

We think it the most important book on the education of children ever written.- 
American Agriculturist. 

Profound in analysis, practical in suggestion, and sagacious in theory.— inrf. 
pendent. 

It throws a rare light upon the importance of studying the natural unfolding • 
the powers, and ministering to them the proper food at the proper time. — Albion. 

Rarelv have we seen a book of more cogent reasoning than this.— A 7 . 1". Kteni* 
Post. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



010 133 621 9 



